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ENGLISH ABSTRACT 
This thesis conducted an evaluation on the Black Swan theory, developed by Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb and its applicability in Political Risk Analysis (PRA). The theory is based on three 
primary characteristics speaking to events which take place that cannot be forecast because; 
(1) the event has a low occurrence probability due to its unknown unknown status and therefore 
cannot be identified. As a result (2) the impact of this event is significantly devastating as it 
changes a country's social, political and economic trajectories. However, although the event 
could not have been identified in order to approach it before its occurrence, (3) Taleb says that 
risk analysts and decision makers conduct a Narrative Fallacy after the fact where they identify 
indicators which would have pointed to its fruition. However, there are several quantitative and 
qualitative methods in PRA which have been used to approach high impact, low probability 
risks and related events. The thesis considers how the concept of PRA has developed and 
expanded to include measures which aid risk analysts in accurately forecasting and 
approaching events of this nature. The thesis then assesses a variety of qualitative and 
quantitative approach strategies to show this. This also presented critiques, oppositions and 
alternatives to Taleb's theory as the applicability of the Black Swan as a classification in PRA 
was then evaluated. This led to the development of the Novice Approach which was then 
applied to three examples in Jordan, Britain and America respectively. Here, Actors, Factors, 
Time (opportunity) and Location were used as the four primary indices to analyse and approach 
the terrorist attacks which took place at music festivals. In doing so, it was shown that scenarios 
such as these should be classified as high impact, low probability events in PRA and not as 
Black Swans. Furthermore, the impact these events may have on a country can be 
predetermined by the socio-political status and resource availability and capacity, meaning that 
the relative approach or mitigation strategy can be implemented. The study then concludes by 
saying that the Black Swan cannot be applied as a classification of events in PRA.  
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AFRIKAANS ABSTRACT 
Hierdie tesis het 'n evaluering gedoen van die “Black Swan” teorie, ontwikkel deur Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb en die toepaslikheid daarvan in Politieke Risiko analise (PRA). Die teorie is 
gebaseer op drie primêre eienskappe wat handel oor gebeure wat nie voorspel kan word nie, 
want; (1) die gebeurtenis het 'n lae voorkoms waarskynlikheid as gevolg van sy onbekende 
status en kan dus nie geïdentifiseer word nie. As gevolg hiervan (2) is die impak van hierdie 
gebeurtenis aansienlik verwoestend, aangesien dit 'n land se sosiale, politieke en ekonomiese 
bane verander. Alhoewel die gebeurtenis nie geïdentifiseer kon word om dit voor sy aanval te 
benader nie, (3) sê Taleb dat risiko-ontleders en besluitnemers 'n “Narratiewe Fallacy” doen na 
die feit waar hulle aanwysers identifiseer wat na sy produksie verwys het. Daar is egter verskeie 
kwantitatiewe en kwalitatiewe metodes in PRA wat gebruik word om hoë impak, lae 
waarskynlikheid risiko’s en verwante gebeurtenisse aan te pak. Die tesis evalueer hoe die 
konsep PRA ontwikkel en uitgebrei het om maatreëls in te sluit wat risiko-ontleders help om 
akkurate voorspellings en benaderende gebeure van hierdie aard te bepaal. Dit oorweeg dan 'n 
verskeidenheid kwalitatiewe en kwantitatiewe benaderings strategieë om dit te toon, waarna 
dit ook kritiek, opposisie en alternatiewe vir Taleb se teorie aanbied, aangesien die 
toepaslikheid van die “Black Swan” as 'n klassifikasie in PRA verder geëvalueer is. Verder het 
dit het gelei tot die ontwikkeling van die Novice Approach, wat dan op drie voorbeelde in 
Jordanië, Brittanje en Amerika toegepas is. Hier is Akteurs, Faktore, Tyd (geleentheid) en 
Ligging gebruik as die vier primêre indekse om die terreur aanvalle wat tydens musiekfeeste 
plaasgevind het, te ontleed en te benader. Daardeur is getoon dat scenario's soos hierdie 
geklassifiseer moet word as hoë impak, lae waarskynlikheid gebeure in PRA en nie as “Black 
Swan” nie. Verder kan die impak wat hierdie gebeurtenisse op 'n land het, vooraf bepaal word 
deur die sosio-politieke status en beskikbaarheid en kapasiteit van hulpbronne, wat beteken dat 
die relatiewe benadering of versagtings strategie geïmplementeer kan word. Die studie sluit 
dan af deur te sê dat die “Black Swan” nie as 'n klassifikasie van gebeure in PRA toegepas kan 
word nie. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Introduction and Background to Study 
1.1.1. History of the Black Swan 
During the period of the Old World1 scientists were convinced that all swans were 
characteristically white in colour, which was proven so by the empirical evidence of the time. 
However, between 1660-1697, Antonie Caen, a Dutch sailor first sighted black swans near 
Bernier Island off the south-western coast of Australia. By this, what was previously considered 
to be absolute was drastically altered to accommodate the discovery of the new swan species 
(Taleb, 2007:xvii).   
The importance of this does not lie within the discovery of the bird, the black swan but rather 
that it illustrates the limitation humans have on the process of learning through observations 
and experiences. This emphasises the fragility of knowledge and how it may be applied. 
Through the discovery of the black swan species, it became evident as to how a singular 
observation has the power to invalidate, restructure and reorganise a general statement or belief 
derived from previous confirmatory events or sightings. The surprising discovery of the black 
swan illustrates the fragility of a person’s belief system and knowledge capacity as experiences 
have the ability to create fallacies about the world and what is to come. As a result, this has 
significant determinacy on insights and approaches employed to forecast critical junctures in 
risk analysis and decision-making (Lindaas & Pettersen, 2016:1231). This process of limited 
learning therefore provides the premise for significant shortfalls in scenario planning, 
mitigation strategies and approaches towards surprising social, political or economic events. It 
is here that the overlapping understanding between risk assessment and risk management in 
Political Risk Analysis (PRA) needs to be further clarified in order to discover the possibility 
of successful approaches to high impact, low probability risks and events.  
By analysing how a false sense of understanding has the impact to derail approaches to 
scenarios, this substantially increases the potential for large-scale impacts in conjunction with 
investment opportunities, foreign exchange or the well-being of a business through the lens of 
PRA. When considering high impact, low probability events (which can be defined as those 
which are not likely to occur when considering the social, political and economic trajectories 
                                                          
1 The Old World Period characterises the 19th century. The discovery of the black swan species in Australia is 
contested, however, occurred between 1660 -1697.   
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of a society) through successful approach strategies, PRA is able to provide a confident 
navigation of these cases in a world which is characterised by large scale uncertainties, risk 
and an ever-increasing complex international environment. Subsequently, with the 
understanding of how the black swan was discovered and the impact it had on ornithology, this 
provided the foundation for the development of the Black Swan Theory developed by Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb. This theory is comprised of a high impact, low probability event and how 
humans fail to clearly identify and assess indicators which may deter it. The term ‘Black Swan’ 
has since then been used by political risk analysts, economists and social anthropologists when 
explaining unpredictable and undirected events which take place in the world in the 21st century 
(Aldous, 2009).    
The concept of the Black Swan in relation to high impact, low probability events gained further 
attention when Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defence between 2002 and 2006 in the 
United States of America (U.S.A) considered its nature and characteristics through the 
following statement at a news briefing. This statement was made in response to the lack of 
evidence linking the government of Iraq with the supply of weapons of mass destruction to 
prominent terrorist groups at the start of the war in Iraq;  
“There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are 
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are 
also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks 
throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that 
tend to be the difficult ones.”  
– 12 February, 2002, Department of Defence news briefing.  
By this statement, events which have the potential to shape political, economic and social 
trajectories can be categorised into three subcategories. The first of these are events and 
variables which we know and have experienced, the known knowns. These are easily 
approached through already established political risk models. The second subcategory are 
events which we know but have yet to experience them, the known unknowns. These risks are 
identified and forecasted alongside an established and operational risk model. They are 
classified as ‘normal’ risks and are easily approached (Day, 2012). The third and final 
subcategory of events is the unknown unknowns. Due to their unknown unknown nature, it 
becomes increasingly difficult, some argue impossible, to forecast and approach events of this 
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nature. Risk analysts do not know what they do not know and therefore cannot apply the 
relevant knowledge and insights to forecast events and successfully approach them. This 
therefore speaks to the extreme element of surprise that is intrinsic to a Black Swan event. 
Taleb refers to this as an outcome arising from of a low probability status as there have been 
no previous events of its kind that would point to its occurrence (Taleb, 2007: 12). The 
inadequacy and shortfall of these risk assessments is therefore what allows for a Black Swan 
event to occur. This can result in largescale devastation as a consequence of ill preparedness 
due to the unforseeability of the event.  
Taleb defines a Black Swan event as political, social or economic risks which he considers as 
outliers. He puts forward three primary characteristics of a Black Swan event and explains why 
they are so irrevocably unavoidable. The first of these characteristics is that these events are 
construed to be ones which expand beyond the logical capabilities and understanding of the 
human mind as they occur outside the realm of regular expectations. Second to this, they carry 
an extreme impact and as a result will have a significant influence on a country’s social, 
political and economic trajectories. The third characteristic of a Black Swan event is that 
regardless of its outlier status and unpredictability, Taleb mentions that it is human nature to 
attempt to account for these events. Here, he mentions how risk analysts fabricate explanations 
and so therefore, a Narrative Fallacy is created. Once a Narrative Fallacy has been construed, 
the fallacy makes the event explainable, calculable and therefore predictable for future cases 
of a similar nature (Taleb, 2007: xviii).   
Additionally, Taleb suggests that predominant reasons for the lack of foresight in anticipating 
and successfully approaching risks is because of the psychological limitations of human 
thinking and decision making. This creates a paramount obstacle not in the nature of these said 
events, but rather in the way they are perceived, understood and therefore approached 
(2007:21). However in contrast to this, other academic authors critique Taleb’s theory by 
saying that events of extreme risk and surprise can be successfully approached by analysing 
relevant indicators and factors. Of these factors, some of the most fundamental include the 
corresponding actors involved, the location of this event, and the timing and the nature of the 
event (Lindaas & Pettersen, 2016:1233).  
Furthermore, Taleb mentions that the way in which a Black Swan event can be visually 
represented is through the plotting of a series of political, social and economic events which 
occur at a consistent rate. These would be classified as known known and some known unknown 
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events. When a Black Swan occurs, the element of surprise and devastation significantly 
disrupts the consistent trajectory and can be seen in a sharp and rapid decline (2007:41). He 
mentions that examples of these declines and disruptions are the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the 
end of the Cold War in 1991, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2008 and the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011. Below an illustration of a Black Swan 
event can be seen.        
Figure1: A Visual Representation of a Black Swan Event  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Taleb, N.N. 2007:41. 
By analysing this visual representation of a Black Swan event, the numbers on the horizontal 
axis are representative of the increasing probability that social, political and economic events 
may occur. The numbers seen on the vertical axis are shown to illustrate the number of days 
which pass before a surprising event with an extraordinary impact takes place. As more days 
pass, the probability of an event increases, leading to disturbance and destruction. The 
probability presented by these variables culminates in a point of capstone which can be 
described as the Black Swan event, as seen by the sharp decline. The severity of this decline is 
indicative of the surprising nature as well as the impact a Black Swan event has on a society, 
organisation or business venture.  
1.1.2. Black Swan Theory and Political Risk Analysis 
Although the Black Swan Theory and its resultant events speak of high impact, low probability 
risks and related events, the shortcomings of its foreseeability lie within the technique 
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employed by risk analysts and decision-makers in PRA. Taleb states that psychological 
blindness to informational clues has a direct influence on the way in which events are perceived 
and therefore approached. This, along with what he calls ‘aggressive ignorance’, is how a Black 
Swan event comes to fruition (2007:21). This ignorance as described by Taleb suggests that 
decision-makers and risk analysts pursue information from a place of emotional bias and 
personal experience. As a result of this, the information needed to strategically approach events 
in risk management becomes warped, resulting in often inaccurate approaches and missed 
targets.           
Although Taleb mentions that these events are inconceivable, there are methods and models 
which have been developed and implemented on a basis of probability to forecast events in 
PRA. An example of this is the Bell Curve or the Monte Carlos Simulation. However, Taleb 
mentions that approaches based on probability ignore large deviations and this results in 
uninformed strategies and a warped understandings of their uncertainty. There are various other 
quantitative approaches which have been established. These include probability statements, 
engineered risk management, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and methods of robust 
optimisation. Additionally, there are a number of qualitative approaches which have been 
successfully implemented in PRA. Some of these examples include scenario planning, early 
warning signals, reasoned imagination, diplomatic approaches and adaptive government 
approaches. These approaches will be further explained in chapter three.  
Regardless of these multifaceted approaches to Black Swans, the possibility of a surprising 
political, economic or social event taking place is still prevalent.  Taleb mentions that this is 
because of  the way in which risk companies conceptualise and subsequently operationalise 
their understandings of risk, which notably exclude the measure and possibility of a Black 
Swan from occurring (Taleb, 2007: xviii). Although the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of these risks have a fundamental role in determining the approaches, Taleb 
(2007:19) as well as Lindaas and Petersen (2016:1232) add that it is the perception of decision-
makers and risk analysts which fosters conceivable expectations which set the agenda for 
approach strategies. This results in these strategies being based on psychological perspectives 
and boundaries, constituting greater complications in nearing high impact, low probability 
events. Furthermore, Taleb mentions that on account of the fact that forecasters have access to 
advanced knowledge regarding variables and possible outliers, this should seemingly propel 
them towards successful and achievable forecasts and approaches to events. However, because 
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they are proficient only at predicting ordinary events, their capabilities in considering irregular 
variables results in their failure to forecast opportunely (2007:149-150).   
Although it is acknowledged that there are both psychological and practical limitations on the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of Black Swan events, Lindaas and Pettersen claim 
that there are no events that are so impactful or irrevocably unpredictable that they become a 
Black Swan (2016:1232). Additionally, they consider how the current political risk models 
might not be equipped with adequate insight and understanding to foresee and approach risks 
leading to Black Swan events. In order for this to become more achievable in PRA, the concept 
of the Black Swan should be adapted and clarified in order to establish successful approach 
strategies so that decision-makers and risk analysts are able to identify risks and forecast events 
efficiently. Through an evaluation of the Black Swan, this will allow high impact, low 
probability risks to become identifiable and computable through PRA. Approaches to these 
events therefore becomes feasible as psychological limitations are eliminated as the relevant 
knowledge and insights are considered without bias. It is therefore necessary to evaluate 
Taleb’s Black Swan and its applicability in PRA. This is the primary focus of this thesis.  
1.2. Preliminary Literature Review   
This preliminary literature review will set the foundation for the literature presented on Black 
Swan theory in relation to PRA. Oppositions to and critiques of to this theory will be further 
considered in chapter two. Here, Taleb’s Black Swan theory is considered alongside some of 
the important primary criticism made by other academics.   
To remind the reader of the characteristics of a Black Swan, firstly it is an outlier as it lies 
outside the realm of expected events. Secondly, because of the element of surprise it carries, it 
results in extreme devastation. The third and final characteristic of a Black Swan event is that, 
in spite of its outlier status, human nature encourages analysts and decision-makers to develop 
explanations for its occurrence after it has taken place – this being known as a Narrative Fallacy 
(Taleb, 2007:xvii-xviii). Taleb considers events of this nature to occur as a result of the fact 
that decision-makers and risk analysts learn with too much precision, instead of considering 
the general variables and the context in which a Black Swan would occur. By acknowledging 
this, the way in which a Black Swan can be formally categorised is through inductive logic, 
whereby a specific premise is formulated by considering general conclusions, therefore 
alluding to the limitations it sets for decision makers and its ultimate unpredictability 
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(2007:27). Additionally, Taleb mentions that by averaging a sample based on past experiences, 
occurrences and matters of probability are insurmountable for the reason that a Black Swan 
event is based on a single and previously unidentified observation. This provides the assertion 
that it is a matter of Extremistan. He mentions that when one considers the flawed methods and 
approach Black Swan events, they are in fact being created at the hands of these decision-
makers and political risk analysts as a result of their lack of foresight (2007:18).  
Blyth (2010) similarly mentions that sample experiences and occurrences only produce the 
outcomes associated with them, whilst risk analysts in PRA fail to consider the invisible, more 
complex generators that are more closely linked to the nature and characteristic of a Black 
Swan. Additionally, Blyth notes that decision-makers and political risk analysts assume that 
sampling past outcomes is a sufficient guide to what future events may look like; however they 
fail to consider the impact invisible variables and more complex outcome generators linked to 
the understanding of a Black Swan may have. He states that agents and their assumptions fail 
in effectively approaching a Black Swan as they only consider outcomes which are associated 
with past experiences. Blyth believes this to be a fundamental reason as to why Black Swans 
are professedly unpredictable to political risk analysts, is that by believing a sample of past 
experiences and occurrences a Gaussian World2 is established and Black Swans are essentially 
missed. Additionally, Blyth mentions that these seemingly invisible and complex outcome 
generators should not be considered as fixed, but rather that they have the potential to produce 
different results than they did in the past (2010:450-451).  
Moreover, Blyth further contemplates Taleb’s notion of Mediocristan and Extremistan by 
formulating the Four Quadrants of Talebism (see Table 1 below). This allows risk analysts to 
consider the dynamics of risk versus uncertainty. In and amongst these two categories, risk 
analysts are able to greater understand the vulnerabilities for Black Swan and Fat Tail Events3 
and how this increases their probability. This is represented in the Four Quadrants of Talebism, 
whereby Blyth has categorised variables, their observability and their impacts into four sub-
                                                          
2 The term ‘Gaussian’ is used predominantly when considering statistical or economic distributions. This means 
that the data under examination is normally distributed. Blyth (2010:450) states that a Gaussian World is one 
whereby the samples are collected and reworked to remove irregularities, in order to build a more predictable 
world, even if this means that the data is skewed. As a result of forecasters and decision-makers working with 
skewed samples, this initiates the foundation for a possible Black Swan event.   
3 A Fat Tail event is similar to that of a Black Swan event however, it is primarily used in financial risk 
management. A Fat Tail is a statistical distribution describing the probability of certain events (Bremmer & Keat, 
2007:10-11).  
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categories. Here he explains how each quadrant represents how and why specific methods and 
approaches work for or against certain variables and how the probability of Black Swan or Fat 
Tail events occur. In addition to this, Blyth notes that the world primarily operates from the 
fourth quadrant of Extremistan, characterised by complex payoffs as a result of the decision-
making process. Blyth puts forward that decision-makers and political risk analysts are only 
able to approach events of risk from the third quadrant, which is characterised by Extremistan 
and simple payoffs (2010:451-452). 
Blyth differentiates between risk and uncertainty by stating that risk occurs where there are 
visible outcome generators whereas he defines uncertainty to be characterised by invisible, 
non-linear, complex payoffs and non-scalable probability distributions (2010:452). As a result 
of the fundamental differences between risk and uncertainty, overlapping of the two definitions 
and understandings create substantial downfalls in risk management and approach strategies 
(2010:448). In addition to this, he puts forward that risk occurs where there are viable and 
understandable outcome generators in which sampling of the past is able to converge into a 
believable mean and variance, which therefore allows for effective approaches to these risks to 
be implemented. An illustration of the Four Quadrants of Talebism, based on what has been 
initially developed by Taleb in 2007, is shown below in Table 1.    
Table 1: The Four Quadrants of Talebism                                Source: Blyth, M. 2010:452.  
 Simple Payoffs  Complex Payoffs  
Mediocristan (thin tales and 
approachable 
risks/uncertainties).  
Quadrant 1: Simple binary 
decisions – statistics and 
probability are reliable.  
Quadrant 2: Statistical 
evidence prove to work 
well. 
Extremistan (Fat tails, non-
scalable probability 
distributions and potential 
Black Swans).  
Quadrant 3: Statistics and 
probability still work, but 
not many simple decisions 
are found in Extremistan.  
Quadrant 4: Statistics and 
probability will not be 
effective – this is considered 
the niche domain for Black 
Swan Events.  
In review of this, Blyth acknowledges that although there are extremely improbable events 
where risk analysts appeal for more data and better approaches towards Extremistan, this falls 
short of a successful approach. Black Swans occur primarily in the fourth quadrant. However, 
knowledge, methods and statistics are chiefly formulated and operationalised from the first to 
the third quadrants. As a result of the limitations of knowledge and strategies formed, this 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
makes the Black Swan event unimaginable and therefore unapproachable. Therefore, 
technologies, methods and approach strategies which allow for successful identification of risk 
and uncertainty from the first to the third quadrant are similarly assumed for the fourth, and 
that this is seemingly why Black Swan events occur without warning (2010:453-454). 
Moreover, Taleb notes that a majority of social, political and even economic matters formulate 
events of Extremistan. This phenomena creates a comprehension disparity of what is able to be 
successfully understood and approached versus that which cannot as a result of knowledge and 
insight limitations. Thus the successful forecast and approach to the risks leading towards a 
Black Swan event is obstructed (Taleb, 2007:33). 
According to Blyth and Taleb, statistics cannot be effectively utilised to approach events in the 
fourth quadrant. Although, Blyth claims that risk analysts seemingly focus on the wrong 
variables and outcomes, he too contemplates whether or not Taleb’s work on the Black Swan 
suggests a more troubled world than what is actually present. He mentions that it must not be 
forgotten that people have lived in a world whereby economic growth has increased and 
political freedoms and governmental structures have been established (2010:455). He further 
argues that the world which Taleb uses to create the premise which would characterise a Black 
Swan event may be a warped version of the world in which we actually live.  
Aven mentions Dennis Lindley, an advocate for the particular use of the Bayesian method of 
probability, who states that what has been contrived by Taleb is false and can be discredited. 
He implies this by saying that the way in which Taleb has conceptualised and operationalised 
Mediocristan and Extremistan is unrealistic, in that the former simply captures placid 
randomness through haphazard approaches, whilst the latter considers randomness too wide 
and dramatic outcomes for approaches to even be slightly effective (2013:44). Furthermore, 
Aven makes mention that fundamental hindrances in being able to successfully approach a 
Black Swan, occurs through  the type of assumptions employed by decision-makers and risk 
analysts. Here, it is assumed that all swans are white (in that they will not have the same 
characteristics and impacts as that of a Black Swan event, meaning that the risk is identifiable 
and approachable) and by doing so, it excludes the possibility and necessary approaches to 
events in the unforeseeable context (2013:45-46). It can therefore be concluded that with the 
correct utilisation of knowledge probability, approaches to a Black Swan can be implemented. 
Any failure in attempting to do so is thus a reflection of the risk analysis itself and its possible 
shortcomings (2013:47).  
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Subsequently, Lindaas & Pettersen mention in their analysis that there cannot be an event so 
irrevocably unpredictable and devastating that it assumes the characteristics of a Black Swan. 
These authors mentioned too how the environment which Taleb describes as suitable for the 
occurrence of a Black Swan is warped and over exaggerated. Furthermore, their primary claim 
is, that unlike Taleb, they believe that although there are unpredictable features of a Black 
Swan, forecasting may be useful in a world with an increase in events of this nature. It is here 
where Lindaas & Pettersen oppose the predictive scepticism of Taleb, as they argue that 
uncertainty is developed in various formats and that by virtue of this, not all Black Swans are 
essentially ‘black’ (meaning unpredictable and unapproachable) (2016:1232).  
Additionally, they mention that by including unknown knowns into the conceptualisation and 
understanding of high impact, low probability events, this will minimise their devastation, 
making them significantly more computable in PRA. Through this analysis and reformulated 
operationalisation, they consider methods of ‘de-blackening’ to make the Black Swan more 
foreseeable and approachable. Moreover, they mention that a fundamental handicap in the 
successful approach to a Black Swan is in its ‘prediction’. The authors mention that Black 
Swans become more understandable and approachable by methods of foreseeing toward the 
extension of information and facts for de-blackening rather than foreknowing. It is in this that 
their primary critique of Taleb’s analysis is founded. Furthermore, they consider imaginative 
principles of increased communication and the development of ideas and concepts as a 
mechanism for widening the territory of ‘predication’ in order to generate the process of de-
blackening and establish a successful approach (2016:1233).  
Similarly, Financier (2013) acknowledges the way in which risk companies and their clients 
should approach risk and events of uncertainty by saying that organisations should examine 
their approach and mitigation strategies. He also mentions that when considering potential high 
impact, low probability risks, risk analysts should focus on the strength and resilience of the 
approaches already established. Political risk analysts therefore should employ techniques such 
as scenario planning, stress testing and supply chain analysis in order to identify relative risks 
and trends which could lead to high impact events. However, Financier additionally mention 
that when these techniques of approach towards high impact, low probability events fail, this 
should serve as a strengthening mechanism against possible future scenarios of uncertainty. 
When these mechanisms of risk management fail to work successfully, these failures will 
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contribute to keeping PRA robust and accurate. The more risk managements fail in their 
approaches, the more opportunity for accuracy and strengthening is presented.  
Similarly, Fox and Williams (2013) claim, that although traditional risk methods and 
approaches are essential in considering the important social, political and economic variables, 
that this does not create a dependable method in forecasting and approaching Black Swan 
events. There is an increased risk that variables with higher consequences attached may be 
entirely missed. They therefore suggest that risks and their predestined variables should not be 
considered in isolation or mutually exclusive of each other, but rather as components of the 
greater functioning of an uncertain world.  
In addition to this, Lindaas and Pettersen contemplate the characteristics and definition of what 
it means for a Black Swan to embody an ‘outlier status’ and determine that, by this, Taleb’s 
description of a Black Swan is seemingly disqualified. They mention that the definition of an 
outlier, being an event taking place outside the realm of expectation in that nothing previously 
points to its existence, is that the expectation of the outlier still exists. Therefore, based on this 
the definition of a Black Swan consisting of unknown unknown events, it suggests that there 
should be no expectation of an unknown event to take place. Therefore the definition of an 
outlier is in conflict with how Taleb defines a Black Swan and the risks comprising it. These 
respective definitions cannot coexist in partnership with one another (2016:1234). The nature 
of the Black Swans and its unforseeability will be further deliberated upon in chapters three 
and four.  
One of the primary claims Lindaas & Pettersen make is that the idea and occurrence of a Black 
Swan is inherently perspectivistic and that their uncertainties and associations depend upon the 
eye of its beholder. They state that the event itself is not a Black Swan to those who plan and 
execute events of devastation. An example of this is the terrorist attacks of 9/11, in that even if 
the event was classified as a Black Swan to victims and other parties affected, it cannot be 
considered as one to those who conducted the attack. By considering this, the authors mention 
that a Black Swan event is only a Black Swan for those it effects, and the impacts of such may 
vary.  Moreover, it is stated that the outlier status of a Black Swan event is not permanently 
static and can be approached successfully through an increase in knowledge and understanding 
of the variables and factors which contribute to its initial occurrence (2016:1235).  
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Bremmer & Keat considers the eventuality of unforeseeable events with a seemingly high 
impact in what they consider as ‘Fat Tails’.  Fat Tails occur when there is an unexpectedly 
thick end or ‘tail’ which occurs towards the ends of a distribution curve, or bell curve, 
indicating an irregularly high likelihood of catastrophic events. These Fat Tails are indicative 
of the particular and potential risks of an event occurring; however due to the difficulty in the 
forecasting of these events, their possibilities are often ignored, thus increasing the occurrences 
for potential Fat Tail risks and events (2007:10-11). Additionally, Bremmer and Keat mention 
that risks such as global warming and its impacts, nuclear terrorism and revolutions can only 
be mitigated and not completely eliminated. They claim that this can be done when companies 
shape their environment successfully which allows decision-makers and risk analysts to 
approach risks which may lead to Fat Tails and Black Swans with increased precision. One of 
the ways they suggest organisations approach these events is through preventative programmes 
which are formulated and cater specifically to the requirements of the client. It is here where 
they suggest that the specific approach to a Fat Tail or Black Swan has an industry specific 
element which should be heavily considered (2007:34).  
Subsequently, Bremmer and Keat have established a variety of techniques and methods which 
they believe are effective in approaching and preparing for events of the unknown. These 
include; methods of isolation whereby clients are encouraged to isolate or separate critical 
assets in order to lower their overall vulnerability, therefore ensuring that not all of their critical 
assets will be open to the threats of these events. Secondly, they recommend that warning 
systems and political forecasting methods be established so as to be used as a contingency. 
This will essentially allow for decision-makers to become increasingly aware of impending 
threats. Thirdly, Bremmer and Keat encourage investors to forge alliances with private 
corporations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), international organisations and private 
stakeholders. By creating these relationships, an increased level of facilitation and coordination 
between the levels of government and private organisations is established which will therefore 
increase responsiveness and accuracy when approaching Fat Tail and Black Swan events. The 
fourth technique suggested is environmental shaping. Here, they state that mitigating risks and 
being proactive in approaching potential Black Swans can take place by influencing the 
environment in which they have invested. This can be done by speaking directly to stakeholders 
and maintaining friendly relationships with local social and political leaders, thus creating an 
environment whereby disputes can be quickly resolved (2007:30-32). By considering these 
alternative strategies and techniques to potential Black Swans and Fat Tails, one is able to 
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determine that risks of this nature are contemplated correctly and can be approached 
effectively.  
Although Black Swans originate from unknown unknown variables and dimensions, by 
acknowledging the sample literature review presented above, it can certainly be said that 
authors who have considered the characteristics and nature of the Black Swan are in definite 
contention regarding its conceptualisation and approach. Whilst Taleb states that there is no 
way in which one can successfully approach a Black Swan, other authors such as Blyth, 
Lindaas & Pettersen and Bremmer and Keat present a variety of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in which investors are able to consider and utilise impending threats. Here 
they acknowledge that through refined conceptualisation and operationalisation, successfully 
approaching a Black Swan is seemingly not as obscure as suggested by Taleb. With this in 
mind, it is upon this foundation that the main research questions and subsequent aims and 
objectives for this thesis were formed.               
1.3. Problem Statement and Focus of Study 
 The way in which a Black Swan has been understood has affected how it is approached in 
PRA. Regardless of the multiple quantitative and qualitative methods aiming to make high 
impact, low probability risks and related events foreseeable and approachable, these methods 
and strategies are hindered by the fact that events of this nature have been considered 
unapproachable. These incapabilities and shortfalls thus extend into the development and 
implementation of PRA models. This thesis therefore aimed to evaluate the Black Swan and 
varying developed approaches in PRA. This evaluation considered the applicability of the 
Black Swan in PRA and whether or not it can still be used to classify events. The author 
contemplates the notion that a Black Swan is inherently perspectivistic. The evaluation was 
done with the location of the event and its devastation in mind. In doing so, a novice approach 
will be applied to three examples in order to consider if they can be classified as Black Swans 
in PRA or not.  
1.4. Research Questions and Objectives 
In order to provide sufficient recommendations on how the Black Swan should be approached 
in PRA, there are research questions and objectives that aim to be acknowledged through the 
analysis of this thesis.  
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The first question: 
Does the evaluation of the Black Swan theory change its relevance in the discipline of PRA? 
To answer this main question, there are two sub-questions which will guide this analysis and 
its answering;    
What are the characteristics of Black Swan events?  
And secondly:  
How can high impact, low probability risks and related events be approached in Political 
Risk Analysis?  
These questions guided the evaluation of the Black Swan theory and its relevance and 
applicability in PRA. The evaluation will be considered through a number of avenues in order 
to determine this.  
1.5. Research Design and Methodology  
The research methodology used to evaluate Taleb’s Black Swan theory in this thesis has been 
done through qualitative methods. A qualitative research methodology is characteristically 
exploratory of reasoning and theory in its nature. This study was a done through desktop 
research, comprising of secondary data as well as semi-unstructured key informant interviews. 
The qualitative research methodology was therefore most effective in the consideration of the 
amount of theoretical information collected and analysed. A review of the underlying reasons, 
opinions and motivations as to why academic authors and risks analysts have varying opinions 
on the Black Swan and approaches towards high impact, low probability events were 
considered. By doing so, increased insights were provided, allowing high impact, low 
probability events to be approached. This will be done by considering a variety of factors as 
proposed by this study. This allowing for the examination of the generalisations surrounding 
the theory and how it has been enigmatically understood in PRA (Burnham et al., 2008:40). 
Using qualitative research methodology, the analysis of the Black Swan theory took place 
primarily through the consideration of secondary sources such as journal articles, books and 
websites from the Stellenbosch University Library. Additionally, other online databases were 
used for further consideration and analysis. Furthermore, as the research conducted is 
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predominantly theoretical and analytical in nature, this study should therefore be considered as 
a desktop study.  
The data was collected through semi-unstructured interviews at the University of Stellenbosch, 
where three interviews took place. The aims of these interviews was to determine what 
academics in future research, scenario building and disaster management consider as a Black 
Swan and the possibility of approaching them. The respondents were asked whether or not they 
agree with Taleb’s Black Swan theory as a form of classification of high impact, low 
probability events.  In addition to this, interviewees were asked if a Black Swan was an event 
which affects all, regardless of industry or location. These questions provided the foundation 
for the interview, however specific questions related to their respective fields were asked too.    
Furthermore, the prescribed outlines of a critical literature review is used to analyse the 
gathered textual data. It was then for the researcher to determine the importance of the content 
of the data by means of his/her judgement. This therefore implies that was for the researcher to 
decide upon the value and interest of the material considered and presented. The researcher has 
accordingly determined which sources proved to be most useful and appropriate when 
considering the evidence which is analysed and presented (Burnham et al., 2008:259).   
Alongside this methodology, this study was simultaneously constructed around the research 
design of an evaluation of the Black Swan theory developed by Nicholas Nassim Taleb. 
Although this can be used alongside both quantitative and qualitative research methods, for the 
purposes of this thesis, a qualitative research methodology and case study design on the Black 
Swan theory was most effective in conducting the evaluation (Burnham et al., 2008:62). This 
allowed for the exploration of a wealth of theoretical data, guided by the methodology and aims 
and objectives. By conducting a critical case study on the Black Swan theory, the thesis 
investigated and tested the proposed theory through an evaluation in order to identify the 
possibilities of alternatives and successful approaches to high impact, low probability risks and 
related events in PRA.  
1.6. Ethical Consideration 
Since primary data was collected, ethical clearance was applied for from the Department of 
Ethics Committee, at the University of Stellenbosch before data collection.    
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1.7. Outline of Chapters  
The above mentioned evaluation and analysis is structured by the following outline of chapters:  
Chapter 1: This chapter provided a brief outline and introduction of the study conducted 
surrounding Black Swan theory. By doing so, it outlined the aims and objectives of the 
research, and its questions. Additionally, the chapter described the research methodology and 
research design of the thesis.  
Chapter 2: This chapter offers a detailed contextualisation of Political Risk Analysis and the 
Black Swan theory whereby critiques to what has been understood as a Black Swan will be 
identified and discussed. The Black Swan’s limitations and the delimitations of the theory will 
be examined as well as how events of this nature can be approached. Furthermore, political 
uncertainty and instability are discussed and how this can lead to high impact, low probability 
events. The chapter further considers the various terminologies and understanding of the Black 
Swan theory and its related events.    
Chapter 3: This chapter is devoted to the critiques, oppositions and alternatives for Taleb’s 
Black Swan theory. The conceptual limitations of Taleb’s theory and how this essentially has 
resulted in the constrained foreseeability of events of the unknown are evaluated. Furthermore, 
the work of other academic authors will be presented in order to further emphasise this as well 
as their proposed approaches for high impact, low probability risk and related events.  
Chapter 4: This chapter focuses on identifying the factors and indicators which allow for 
successful approaches to high impact, low probability risks in PRA. A Novice Approach 
comprising four primary indicators - Actors, Factors, Time (opportunity) and Location will be 
applied to three examples of events which have taken place in different locations. The chapter 
will show that when this approach is applied in a risk analysis, that event can be forecasted or 
effectively mitigated. In addition to this, the approach will show how resource availability and 
capacity of a specific location significantly determines the impact and devastation of these 
events as well as their time of recovery.  
Chapter 5: This concluding chapter will present the conclusions of the analysis and the 
findings. The chapter will also present implications for future studies in PRA.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
 
1.8. Conclusion   
In summary, this chapter should be considered as a guideline of the evaluation of the Black 
Swan theory and its applicability in PRA. Here the characteristics and nature of a Black Swan 
have been mentioned and defined as well as the varying opposing arguments and critiques. By 
analysing this, it is necessary to consider the limitations of Taleb’s Black Swan theory and how 
this is problematically understood and applied to high impact, low probability events in PRA. 
By evaluating how the Black Swan is conceptualised by Taleb alongside critiques and 
alternatives presented by other authors, this will determine its applicability in PRA. This will 
be done in the following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
18 
 
CHAPTER TWO: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS AND 
THE BLACK SWAN THEORY  
2.1. Introduction  
When considering PRA and the challenges a Black Swan event may have on approaches and 
models, Bremmer and Keat state, ‘Often it is not easy to deconstruct political risk in terms of 
its causes, probability, and impact. That does not mean that the process of analysing difficult 
issues is not valuable” (2009:5). Rather, in this study, the opposite of this statement is vitally 
important. It is essential to evaluate the Black Swan in relation to PRA in order to understand 
the possibilities of making what we essentially do know to be more admissible than what we 
do already know. This would therefore establish a successful approach to high impact, low 
probability events. In PRA, it is important to assume a certain degree of uncertainty about 
future scenarios. However, although uncertainty shapes the prowess of an approach, that it is 
important to identify the environment, actors and additional factors which shape this 
uncertainty. Once this has been identified and considered, the element of its surprise and the 
impact of its occurrence becomes significantly marginalised.  
Alongside the primary consideration of the Black Swan theory, it is necessary to understand 
the conceptualisations and opperationalisation surrounding PRA and how risk assessments and 
approaches confront deep uncertainties. With the objective of understanding the inner workings 
of a Black Swan event, there should be a clear comprehensions of PRA, its approaches, 
methods and strategies. Once this has been considered effectively, one will be able to 
understand the limitations of the approaches towards Black Swan events. By doing so, an 
effective evaluation of the Black Swan and its applicability to PRA is undertaken.   
This chapter will examine and critique the literature presented on both PRA as well as the Black 
Swan theory. It is important that this is done in order to acknowledge the conceptual growth of 
PRA and whether or not a Black Swan can be used as a classification of events in PRA. As 
previously mentioned, it is important to examine these as separate concepts before 
contemplating how they lend themselves to either risk management and assessment or events 
of significant devastation.  
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2.2. Political Risk Analysis: A Literature Review  
When considering the theory of PRA, it is important to make mention that the related 
conceptualisations, limitations and delimitations have been widely debated and contested 
amongst academics. How PRA has been conceptualised and thus operationalised is particularly 
difficult and has resulted in performance and accuracy discrepancies. It is here where the 
tension between quantitative and qualitative approaches towards risk management arises. It is 
important to acknowledge that PRA has developed through its conceptualisation resulting in 
various approaches to risk and in doing so, has accommodated for the development of high 
impact, low probability events.  
2.2.1. Understanding the Concept of Political Risk Analysis  
Korbin is considered to be one of the first authors to theoretically engage with PRA. His 
conceptualisation of PRA was loosely defined as it was understood as a relatively new field in 
academia. Additionally, PRA as a technique to approach and manage events of risk and 
uncertainty is also considered to be a new strategy in risk analysis (1979:69). Since the 
publication of his work on the definition of PRA however, there have been significant 
conceptual and operational developments, thus providing the grounds for more effective 
approach and mitigation strategies. Kobrin furthermore mentions that most analysts 
misunderstand the concept of political risk which has significant effects on the assessment and 
evaluation of politics. Therefore, the integration of the accumulated political information into 
a system of decision-making is general, subjective and superficial. It is here where the downfall 
of a successful approach begins.  
Many scholars of political risk consider it to be an event which occurs, such as a form of 
instability (social, political or economic), or in conjunction with the environment (such as a 
process of nationalisation). Kobrin states that this is associated with the actions and decisions 
of a government and thus yields unfavourable consequences for the client in question. 
Therefore, it is determined that political risk is the risk or probability of the occurrence of some 
political events which results in the influx of profitability of a given investment (Korbin, 
1979:68). Subsequently, Robock (1971:7) considers the operational definition of political risk 
to be when risk in international business exists as a result of discontinuities in the business 
environment, when they become difficult to anticipate and when they result from political 
change. He continues to say that while all political and economic environments are dynamic 
and have the impact to influence drastic shifts, changes which are gradual and progressive, are 
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neither unexpected nor difficult to anticipate and should not be considered as political risk. 
Robock acknowledges risk to be slow-motion and that will continue to develop over time. This 
development becomes foundational in PRA as it becomes apparent that it is possible to identify 
risks, anticipate their impacts and approach them accordingly. However, he mentions that 
although instability and its effects can be considered as political risk depending on the 
perspective its conceptualisation is developed from, it is essentially separate and not 
representational of risk in international business (1971:9). Whilst the distinction between 
political and economic risk is warranted and essential for specialised and accurate approaches, 
it must be noted here that progressive and expected risks should still be considered in risk 
management. The distinction between models which consider current events versus those 
which forecast events of high risk are different in compilation and execution.  
Weston and Sorge (1972:60) define political risk as actions of the national government which 
interfere with or prevent business transactions, change in the terms of agreements, or cause the 
confiscation of wholly or partially foreign owned business property. Similarly, Aliber 
(1975:162) and Eiteman and Stonehill (1973:57), define political risk as governmental or 
sovereign interference with business operations. This can be further expanded to include 
political acts, constraints imposed on a firm, or a combination of both. Therefore, events which 
result in any disturbances for businesses are considered as a risk. The importance of such risks 
is observer dependent and is therefore determined by the nature of the business, and its location 
or industry.   
According to Van Agtmael (1976:26-27), the difference in approaching political risk can be 
found in environmental factors such as instability, direct violence, corruption, one party 
dominance, expropriation, discriminatory taxation and the like. These factors and indictors 
have the potential to result in large scale disturbances, resulting in significant impacts on 
investments and other business operations. Similar to this, Brooke, Michaels and Remmers 
(1970:83), do not explicitly define the concept but rather consider the specific workings of the 
host country to be a source of political risk for the respective client. Therefore by this 
understanding of PRA, the state is considered as the primary source of analysis. How the host 
country has structured its government may be source of concern. Here risks between countries 
which are democratic or communists may vary and have differing impacts on investments4.     
                                                          
4 Investors may assume that investing in Western liberal democracies carries a lesser risk than investing in 
communist countries. However, authors have considered the pros and cons of each. Democratic countries are 
said to be more stable due to their increasing consolidation and institutionalisation. However, these countries 
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Simon (1984:125), considers political risk to be concerned with the identification, analysis, 
management and reduction of socio-political risks to foreign investments. Simon takes the 
concept of PRA further by analysing how the dyadic relationships between the state and 
multinational organisations are points of risk. He focuses on national interests, sovereignty and 
identity as the motivating factors behind the host government and the possible restrictions this 
may have on foreign business activity. In addition to this, Simon makes mention of Gurr’s work 
on relative deprivation5 which points to a high level of national frustration as a key determinant 
of expropriations. Here, the host government uses the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) as a 
scapegoat for the country’s complications and societal frustrations. The method of 
scapegoating becomes a strategy in which a host government manages discontent, however, 
often at the cost of a healthy business relationship with the MNE (Zonis et.al. 2011:91). It 
therefore becomes clear that, through the understanding of relative deprivation that when the 
expectations and needs of societal members are not met, this leads to increased levels of 
frustrations and anti-government thought, resulting in large scale social and political instability. 
This can have significant effects on the risk of investing in a specific country and has the 
potential to lead to financial and political devastation. This instability, if not managed correctly 
could lead to high impact, low probability events. Political instability will be further discussed 
later on in the chapter.  
When considering the abovementioned, PRA has been conceptualised with a predominant 
focus on either financial losses or gains as a result of either economic in/stability or 
political/social in/stability. Alongside this, Robock differentiates between political instability 
and political risk. He mentions that, due to the conceptualisation of political instability and 
PRA, although instability may result in elevated levels of risk, this is a separate phenomenon 
to that of PRA (1971:8-9). Therefore the two should not be considered as mutually inclusive. 
The understanding of political instability and PRA has become increasingly important to 
                                                          
are more susceptible to political and social instability due to the fact that the government has a responsibility in 
satisfying the needs and desires of its population (Freedom House, 2018). See footnote below for more. 
Communist countries such as China, who have large investment opportunities, are considered as high risk 
ventures as their economic system pursues nationalist policies. Nationalistic policies consider monetary 
distribution as a primary characteristic that could be harmful to investors. However, because communist 
countries have a consistency about their policies in that they are not often reformed as in democratic countries, 
this presents stability for MNE’s (Buckley, 2017).  
5 Gurr argues that relative deprivation is essentially a gap between a societal groups value expectations and the 
actual value capabilities of the country. He states that as this gap widens, the potential for revolutionary 
behaviour increases, thus leading to events contributing to social and political instability (1968:1104). Political 
instability is considered to be one of the major leading factors to high impact, low probability events, meaning 
the occurrence of a Black Swan.   
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decision-makers as events of this nature may affect their investments or lead to unforeseeable 
events. In contrast to this, Sottilotta (2017:12) specifies that, due to the intrinsically 
interdisciplinary nature of PRA, political risk as such has been neglected as a field of study and 
as a result, an agreed upon conceptualisation of the term has not been established. Furthermore, 
she makes mention that PRA still remains largely misinterpreted regardless of the large 
amounts of academic literature presented on the interlinked concept of political instability. She 
considers how political instability and PRA should not be considered separately when 
analysing risks. It will be shown how the conceptualisation and understanding of PRA has 
expanded to include the analysis of political instability, and how the two today cannot be 
considered mutually exclusive.   
In reference to Korbin’s conceptualisation of PRA, Haendal, West and Meadow (1975:63) 
similarly mention a clear distinction between the political event and the actual loss or gain to 
the firm. They note the consequences of any given political event for the foreign investor 
depend upon its nature, the conditions under which it occurs and the characteristics of the 
specific investment in question. Similar to this, Root (1972:355) states PRA to be the 
possibility of any political event (such as war, revolution, coup d’état, expropriation, taxation, 
import restrictions or exchange controls) at home or abroad which may result in potential profit 
or asset loss in an international business operation. Root makes a distinction between political 
and economic risk, stating there is an interdependence between economic and political 
phenomena. It is therefore the dynamics of the host country which either elevates or reduces 
the level of risk. If the host country is one comprised of a hostile environment, MNE’s should 
be made aware that there is an increasing chance of citizen dissatisfaction and political 
instability which may lead to high impact political events.   
Sottilotta (2013:2) mentions in her findings that the initial conceptualisation of PRA resulted 
from the influence economic/financial risk factors have. She puts forward that risk analysts 
were mostly concerned about investment disputes derived from economic nationalism or any 
other economic/financial risk which may negatively affect business ventures. She 
acknowledges two strategic events which took place that influenced international business and 
the nature of globalisation as well as how PRA is conceptualised and operationalised. The first 
of these two events was the ending of the Cold War in 1960, whereby the ideological contrast 
between socialism and capitalism6 became the outlook for how risk was understood and 
                                                          
6 The ending of the Cold War in 1960 resulted in a change in the global system whereby free market trade and 
planned economies had to be deliberated amongst international powers. In addition to this, the end of the Cold 
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approached. The second event places a greater focus on the likelihood of political events. 
Sottilotta mentions how the 1956 Suez Crisis7 suddenly and drastically changed the political 
as well as the business environment. It was through these events that it became evident that the 
nature of the world order had begun to change, resulting in increased levels of uncertainty. 
These changes resulted in greater risks and the social, political and economic trajectories 
thereof became more unpredictable.  
Furthermore, Sottilotta (2013:2-3) acknowledges a second wave of events which probed the 
rethinking of PRA. One such event was the Oil Shock in 1973. She says that with the increasing 
nature of events such as this, it became apparent that risk assessment and management needed 
to become integral parts of business ventures in order to develop approach and protection 
strategies. A third set of defining events once again challenged the conceptualisation of PRA. 
The terrorist attack of 9/11 on the World Trade Centres in the United States of America in 2001 
have since alerted investors to the increasing prevalence and risk of terrorist activity and how 
this may negatively impact business ventures and social and political stability. Similarly, Berry 
(2010:14) puts forward that terrorism has become a source of concern for international 
investors and should be considered as a primary risk factor when conducting a risk assessment. 
He also mentions that prior to the 9/11 terrorist attack, investors separated terrorism and the 
insurance market as they believed that the one bore no impact on the other. However, Berry 
calls for MNE’s to consider PRA as a prerequisite as a part of their Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI) whereby the dynamics of terrorism, extortion and other forms of political 
violence are incorporated into the conceptualisation and opperationalisation of PRA.     
As risk had begun to develop to include previously unconsidered factors, risk analysts found 
that specified types of risks and risk models needed to be developed and implemented 
according to the needs and aims of MNE’s. Sottilotta (2013:1) therefore states that Country 
Risk8 is a necessary component to be considered complementary to PRA. This should be done 
in order to account for the causes of insolvency of a country that is not directly linked to 
                                                          
War marked the beginning of the decolonisation process of African and Asian countries. Here, these previously 
controlled countries fought for their political and economic independence, leading to a reshuffling of the world 
order and the international economy (Sottilotta, 2013:2).   
7 The Suez Crisis of 1956 happened after Israeli troops pushed into Egypt and into the Suez Canal. This occurred 
after the president of Egypt at the time nationalised the canal, limiting Israeli use of and access to the Canal. 
French and British actors then became involved due to their role in building the canal. However, this event was 
inevitable due to the changing nature of the global order at the time (History: Suez Canal, 2018).  
8 Country Risk is defined as the creditworthiness of a specific country. Here, capital flow, debt service payments, 
a country’s default history as well as its external debt is investigated and measured as an economic risk 
(Sottilotta, 2017:12).    
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financial or economic factors. She mention that the risks of an MNE are largely economic based 
on the ability to service financial obligations, but it is not the only factor to be considered in 
risk analysis. A more contemporary understanding of Country Risk should refer to a wider 
range or risk, which do not only consider potential financial risks but also those which are more 
operational in nature (2007:3). Furthermore, Sottilotta acknowledges the academic writings of 
Howell, whereby he comments that Country Risk is of a larger scale, where the incorporation 
of economic and financial characteristics of a host country as well as political and social 
dynamics should be analysed. Howell states that by combining these disciplines and spheres, 
PRA increases the precision in its efforts at successfully forecasting situations which foreign 
investors will find problematic (2007:7).  
With the understanding of Country Risk in mind, Busse (2006:399) and Simon (1984:127) state 
that when a MNE invests in any given country, it agrees to the laws of the country by immersing 
itself into its inner socio-political workings. Therefore, how the MNE will experience risk is 
directly dependent on the interactions between key actors and those in power. Busse puts 
forward that the degree of risk is solely dependent on the strategic behaviour of the MNE and 
that it is at liberty to minimise the effects of risk and instability by shaping its environments 
and developing applicable approach and mitigation strategies. Therefore, the way in which 
investors would do this is dependent on their specific environment, industry, aim and 
perspective of potential risks. Although the hostility of the environment is country specific, this 
can be navigated by the actions of the MNE, whilst still ensuring the profitability and safety of 
its investments.      
Risks can be understood and approached through conceptual developments in PRA as well as 
through specific behaviours. However, Kansal (2015:2) gives a more contemporary definition 
of PRA. This definition acknowledges a wider range of potential risks and how these may affect 
investor outcomes, which other definitions may exclude. This definition constitutes political 
risk as being the future contingency of deviation of ex-post returns from ex-ante returns of a 
particular investment, which may be either profitable or unprofitable. However, although this 
definition is economic centric, the author mentions that there is no universally accepted 
definition of PRA. Some of the primary considerations within the conceptualisation that risk 
analysts and companies have chosen to include are region specific risk related factors and how 
these may be approached. This is done through the categorisation and conceptualisation of 
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micro and macro risks9. Political risk can either be systematic or unsystematic providing a 
paradox when it comes to defining political risk, making it important for investors to be able 
to shape the definition according to their sectors and business ventures. In addition to this, 
Kansal (2015:7) puts forward the view that another important aspect within the 
conceptualisation of PRA is that of the actions of government and non-government entities. He 
considers that these actions could have severe impacts on MNE’s and other business ventures 
and should be analysed in a separate category. However, he states that although it is important 
to consider these risks separately, due to the fact that economic, social and political risks cannot 
be considered as mutually exclusive from one another, it should not be completely alienated in 
the risk assessments conducted.    
By acknowledging how the conceptualisation of PRA has expanded in academia to include not 
only economic, political and social events, the investor or risk analyst is at liberty to construct 
his/her own definition. Bischoff and Lambrechts consider the primary purposes of PRA are the 
identification and forecasting of potential losses or events that have the potential to reduce 
returns (2010:60). They mention an additional function of PRA is to suggest strategies in which 
the identified risks can be mitigated in order to avoid potential losses. They claim that although 
risk aversion is integral to the conceptualisation and understanding of PRA, formulating 
country strategies should also form part of the conceptual and operational foundations 
(2010:60-61). Therefore, it is not only within the study and practice of PRA to conceptualise 
and measure specific risks, but these risks should also be approached and mitigated through 
risk models and strategies in order to protect investments.   
Bischoff and Lambrechts further explain that in the era of increased globalisation and 
regionalism, it must be questioned whether or not the analysis of only political, economic and 
social risks attributed to the host country provide an accurate analysis of the risks faced by 
international organisations. They suggest that it is imperative for political risk to be assessed 
on a regional scale and include the regional unit as a primary component of the analysis. 
                                                          
9 PRA is categorised into two categories, micro and macro risk factors. Macro risks are considered to be 
environmental events which affect all foreign firms in a country, without regard for organisational 
characteristics. Examples of this would be corruption within the government, regime in/stability or poverty. On 
the other hand, micro risks are considered to be more industry, firm and even project specific. Examples of micro 
risk factors are energy vulnerability, restriction of flow on funds or class stratification (Allon et. al., 2006:626 & 
628). Political risk models can either place a greater focus on macro or micro risks, depending on the needs of 
the client, which will thus establish successful forecasts and approach strategies. With the separation between 
macro and micro risk factors, the specification of these risks allows for risk analysts to operationalise with more 
precision. By doing so, high, medium and low impact events can be better approached and observed.    
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Furthermore, they make mention of the increasing importance of the host region and the 
traditional understanding of the host nation as suggested by previous understandings of PRA 
(2010:61). Subsequently, as a result of the vast diversification experienced in international 
business, the globalisation of markets and the growth of international portfolio investment have 
changed the conventional way in which business is conducted, i.e. conducting a risk assessment 
is imperative for a successful business venture. Because the realms of business and politics are 
so intrinsically linked, PRA as a discipline must incorporate these changes in order to execute 
successful business operations (2010:58).  
PRA is considered as an over-arching concept of risk management and approaches. These more 
specialised conceptualisations, such as Regional Risk10, offer greater accuracy when 
approaching risk. PRA houses the understandings of risk from the social, economic and 
political spheres of society whereby models are generated to specifically consider the 
respective risks from these factors. Other more centralised concepts than these arenas should 
be considered too. Alongside Country Risk analysis, some of these specialised subcategories 
are; Transfer Risk11, Political-Security Risk12 and Regional Risk. These specialised branches 
of PRA which are able to facilitate a more accurate analysis of current circumstances as well 
as potential events, allowing for greater approaches towards high impact, low probability 
events.  
It is important to acknowledge how the differences in the conceptualisation and 
opperationalisation of these kinds of risks results in a variety of models, techniques, strategies 
and approaches. With the conceptual developments that have taken place in PRA and its 
                                                          
10 Regional Risk analysis is defined by Bischoff & Lambrechts (2010:60) to be the consideration of the risks not 
only in the specific country in consideration but the region as a whole. Due to the fact that globalisation has 
changed the nature of business operations, it is stated that considering the dynamics of a region has become 
imperative for a successful business venture. Here it can be said that what may unfold in the region in question 
may have significant impacts on business ventures, profitability and safety and so therefore need to be 
stringently accounted for. 
11 Transfer Risk is considered to be the risk which refers to the sub-dimensions such as regulatory quality, 
monetary policies in place and the investment and financial freedoms of the investor in the host country. More 
importantly, Transfer Risk refers to the conversion dynamics and laws from one currency into the other. This too 
encompasses the risk that after a financial loan, the borrower would not be able to convert local currency into 
foreign exchange and will therefore not be able to make debt-service repayments (Sottilotta, 2017:63 & OECD, 
2017).   
12 Political-Security Risk is considered as the vulnerabilities which flow from political risks and policy responses 
to certain threats, in a specific country. Amongst these kind of risks include political action such as unpopular 
legislation leading to widespread unrest, labour actions and terrorism. It can be said that Political-Security Risk 
is a specialised branch of PRA (as those mentioned above can too be considered to be) and encompasses a 
number of elements of political risk in order to provide a more accurate analysis (Fouché 2003:18 in Lambrechts 
et al., 2011:111).  
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specialised sub-categories, it has allowed for risk analysts to successfully approach and 
mitigate events specific to the nature of the business or dynamics of the host country. Risk 
models are therefore more refined and the approach strategies for higher risk occurrences are 
more precise. It is important to acknowledge these conceptual developments in order to assess 
the possibilities of high impact, low probability events with greater knowledge and accuracy 
and whether or not an approach is possible. By understanding the differing risks factors and 
variables and how these can be identified and addressed, high impact, low probability events 
should theoretically be significantly minimised.      
By considering the abovementioned conceptualisation phases of PRA, it is imperative to 
acknowledge that what was previously economic centric has evolved to accommodate political 
and social trajectories. PRA was once considered a loosely defined concept and now 
encompasses more specialised definitions and approaches in order to ensure successful risk 
assessment and management. Through this evolution of PRA, concepts such as political 
instability, political uncertainty as well as forecasting versus predicting have become 
synonymous with the conceptualisation and opperationalisation in PRA. Political instability 
and uncertainty often lend themselves to hostility within the host country, as citizen 
dissatisfaction, rule of law and poor governance are increased. This increases the risk of 
investing and should be acknowledged as a possibility through risk assessments. Furthermore, 
because of the proposed unpredictability of a Black Swan, the concepts of forecasting versus 
prediction will are analysed in this study. By looking at the limitations of these concepts, the 
possibility of approaching Black Swan events will be investigated.  
2.2.2. Political Instability and Political Uncertainty in Political Risk Analysis  
Political instability and political uncertainty in PRA are significantly interlinked and form the 
conceptual foundation of how risk analysts develop their approach strategies. Political 
instability has been closely linked to the risk ratings given by risk analysts when considering a 
host country and so therefore should be acknowledged as a primary concept. It again should be 
mentioned that the way in which political instability and political uncertainty are 
conceptualised determines how they are operationalised though risk models and how high 
impact, low probability events may be approached.   
Citron and Nickelsburg (1986:385) consider political instability to be a synchronised, non-
diversifiable or unsystematic type of risk in that it is specific to the host country and is the type 
of uncertainty the investor should inevitably prepare for. This risk is inherent in the market 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
28 
 
economy or environment in which investors finds themselves and is thus an important 
consideration in risk management. The authors further mention that non-diversifiable risk can 
also be defined as the political volatility or instability experienced in a specific country. Zonis 
et.al. (2011:1) mention that political stability is formed by the satisfaction of the people. 
Therefore, political instability or non-diversifiable risk is measured by the political and social 
dynamics of a country or region. Examples of this are strikes, boycotts or any other form on 
anti-government action as a result of corruption, unfulfilled promises and the general discontent 
of the citizenry. However, Citron and Nickelsburg further consider that non-diversifiable risk 
is essentially the potential volatility of a set country and therefore is considered as a risk factor 
which is measurable. They mention that, as a result of this, political instability refers to the 
temperament or behaviour of governmental actors or members of society in coordination with 
the influxes this may have on stocks and investments. This is what makes non-diversifiable 
risks measurable and approachable in times of increased uncertainty (2011:387).  
Power (2004:22) considers political instability and political uncertainty as mutually 
unexclusive from one another and should both be considered by risk analysts in their 
investigations and findings. He states that political instability, as a prominent risk factor in 
PRA, results in the political uncertainty of the environment in which the MNE finds itself. It 
can therefore be assumed that political instability is considered as a result of political 
uncertainty. Power additionally mentions that political uncertainty should be noted in risk 
management and by MNE’s however, it cannot be approached. He puts forward that there is 
an element within PRA that cannot be identified and can only be managed once the instability 
arises. This suggests that there are certain events in risk which cannot be forecast and that these 
risks carry a significant element of surprise which can only be managed and not avoided. In 
agreement, Sottilotta (2017:7) mentions that there is a causal relationship between political 
uncertainty and political instability which results in radical change in the host country. She 
further mentions that political instability can be considered as a form of political uncertainty. 
However, she opposes Powers claim by saying that political instability can be timely measured 
and approached in PRA.      
Although, political instability and uncertainty have been equated with the socio-political and 
economic factors of a host country, Aharoni (1966:99) claims that risk is not necessarily the 
results of an impact from a specific event. He mentions that risk increases with the amounting 
ignorance and uncertainty analysts may be privy towards in their assessments. However, 
Knight (1971:223) has a more quantitative conceptualisation and opperationalisation of 
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uncertainty and puts forward that risk and uncertainty depend on whether or not probabilities 
can be associated with the outcomes. The more risk analysts can match probabilities with 
outcomes, the more political uncertainty and political instability can be minimised. He 
continues to say that when analysts evaluate potential risks, they already have significant 
knowledge of a variety of possible outcomes which may be associated with that specific event. 
This is either formed as a result of probability statements and other calculation formats or from 
past experience. This will be further elaborated on in chapter three. It is here that Knight 
considers how it may be possible to approach uncertainty and instability with a compelling 
amount of precision if risk analysts examine past experiences and probability equations 
correctly.   
 In contrast to the above, Kobrin states that uncertainty is subjective and that knowledge of the 
possible outcomes and objective probabilities exists. Furthermore, he mentions that uncertainty 
is subjective as it is distorted by past experiences, the cognitive processes of analysts and the 
nature of the organisation (1979:71).  He goes on to critique Knight’s argument in saying that 
uncertainty in risk remains unapproachable and a factor that MNE’s should accept as an 
inevitable part of PRA. Kobrin continues by saying that a MNE can reduce this risk by 
curtailing subjective uncertainty. He acknowledges though, that the existing literature is 
problematic in allowing a conversion of uncertainty into measurable and approachable risk. 
This is because opinions about future events and the political and economic environment will 
always be inherently subjective as well as observer-dependent (1979:75). Similarly Venter 
(1999:73) notes that events of this nature are discontinuous and that they are not predictable on 
the basis of inductively derived generalisations or probability statements. He continues to say 
that a descriptive analysis of political and social trends of a particular state can provide risk 
analysts and decision-makers with early warning signs of possible high or low impact and 
probability of events. PRA is therefore a process of practical logic, yielding general statements 
that can be applied to the future (1999:74). 
Continuing with how risk is approached, Simpson (2015) introduces a new idea when 
considering the measurement of uncertainty in PRA. He puts forward that many academics 
have used the measurement of volatility (or non-diversifiable risk) as proxy to risk. This 
demonstrates how much a given number/probability can vary over a period of time. It therefore 
suggests that the wider the range of these possibilities, the greater the increase in risk. The 
escalation in these probabilities will in turn increase uncertainty, exposing MNE’s to a wider 
range of non-diversifiable risks which have not yet been effectively considered. This allows 
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for the development of unexpected events. However, he mentions that individual investors as 
well as MNE’s choose to measure volatility instead of risk as it seemingly exposes the investor 
to a wider range of possibilities. By doing so, this allows for investors to identify and approach 
high impact, low probability events with increased accuracy.   
By considering the literature presented on political instability and uncertainty, it is determined 
that uncertainty is a fundamental result of political instability, volatility or non-diversifiable 
risk. However, some authors mention that uncertainty cannot be measured but should be 
considered a prerequisite when investing. Others state that by considering past experiences and 
a range of probability statements, both political instability and the political uncertainty can be 
successfully accounted for, although, within this lies the issue of forecasting versus predicting 
in PRA. Political uncertainty is inevitable in PRA, and the way in which this is identified will 
result in how approaches may be increasingly successful.  The credibility of the risk assessment 
thereof is determined by whether or not risk analysts are able to present their findings through 
methods and strategies that result in accuracy and reliability or not. This introduces the 
discussion on forecasting versus predicting in PRA which will be presented in the following 
section.   
2.2.3. Forecasting Versus Predicting in Political Risk Analysis 
In PRA the difference between forecasting and predicting is what makes risk analysis 
successful, reliable and credible or not. Futuristic thinking and planning have in the past been 
stringently avoided by political scientists and risk analysts due to high levels of uncertainty and 
scepticism it results in. Crick (2015:347) mentions that sociologists and economists have used 
futuristic thinking, planning and management as part of their daily tasks however, political 
scientists have neglected this strategy. Similar to this, Schneider (2014:213) mentions that the 
reason political scientists are disinclined to consider methods of futuristic thinking and 
forecasting is due to the high level of unsuccessful statistics that have resulted. Schneider 
further mentions that risk analysts and political scientists prefer explaining rather than 
predicting and that forecasting is considered as a naïve approach to potential events (2014:214).    
Sottilotta (2017:39) considers forecasting to be based on probabilistic statements, which is 
made on a relatively high confidence level about the future, whereas a prediction is a non-
probabilistic statement that shows where the social, political and economic trajectories are 
headed. However, a prediction suggests that there is an appearance of precision but previous 
use of this shows that it has resulted in poor execution and therefore gives the investor no 
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reason to trust the numbers presented. In comparison to this, a forecast considers the 
probabilities of possibilities and as a result, makes mention of the many possible differing 
outcomes that could simultaneously take place over an extended period of time and within a 
specific area (2017:40).  
With knowing the fundamental characteristics of PRA, forecasting and prediction rely heavily 
on causal relationships between the investor and a given environment. This will have certain 
structural features which will hinder or favour the activities of the investor. Furthermore, when 
establishing relevant risk factors and models upon which they can be analysed and measured, 
political risk does not aim to predict specific events. It is the job of a political risk analyst to 
forecast the likelihood of what may happen and assess the impact thereof. This is because 
forecasts are provisional and fallible and provide a probabilistic view of the future, along with 
the necessary tools to prepare for differing outcomes. Therefore it can be determined that a 
prediction is much easier to discard than a forecast (Sottilotta, 2017:40). Goerg (2013:1) 
acknowledges that there are specific components and methods which typically improve the 
accuracy of forecastability. These components are often considered and compiled into 
probability statements however, Clements and Hendry state that risk analysts and politicians 
can consider regularities and irregularities about the future in order to make an accurate 
forecast. By identifying key factors from past experiences alongside the current occurrences 
can assist forecasting. However, by relying too much on past experiences can warp the 
perspective needed to correctly identify current events. Taleb mentions that this is how Black 
Swans are established (2004:12).   
Considering the above, Taleb (2007:149-150) mentions in his findings that one of the primary 
reasons why forecasts and similarly predictions fail more often than not, is that risk analysts 
and decision-makers consider irrelevant and outdated information. He puts forward that 
predictors and forecasters are only good at predicting the ordinary and fail to consider the 
irregularities. In addition to this, he indicates that, although analysts are informed about 
forthcoming contracts, planned expenditures and activities relevant to the company, this should 
substantially propel accurate forecasts. However, because forecasters do not look past the data 
at hand, is why risk analysts fail to approach high impact, low probability events.  
Additionally, Sottilotta (2017) considers that it is within the very nature of political risk that 
events arise from future interactions between the MNE’s and the given environment in which 
they find themselves. She furthermore claims that, when considering the host environment of 
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the investment, forecasting of potential risks or events is dependent on the pre-existing social, 
political and economic structures and the constraints these structures may contain them. 
Despite the fact that there is a causal relationship between the choices and actions of the 
investor, the structures within the host environment constitute a large determining factor as to 
what is possible to forecast or not, as this acts as a factor of limitation (2017:41). Although 
forecasting political events and the effects of risks in a host country are not without flaws or 
inaccuracies, after considering the presented literature on forecasting and predicting it can be 
determined that by analysing the correct information it is possible to gage potential future 
events.  
2.2.4. The Black Swan Theory and Political Risk Analysis  
The Black Swan theory was coined and developed by Nassim Nicholas Taleb and was based 
on the unexpected discovery of the black swan bird species in Australia during the 17th century. 
This theory speaks about social, political and economic events which take place and have the 
potential for high impact, resulting in significant distress and disorder. Taleb mentions that 
these events occur as a result of how risk analysts and decision-makers learn. Therefore 
information that is assessed with too much precision, neglects the examination of general 
indicators, facts and occurrences resulting in unanticipated events and missed approaches 
(Taleb, 2007:xxi).  
The three primary characteristics comprising a Black Swan event are, firstly it is an outlier in 
its very nature in that it lies outside the realm of regular expectations. By this, Taleb puts 
forward that it cannot be acknowledged or approached as nothing in the past can convincingly 
point to its possibility. He mentions that one is inherently unable to predict these outliers, thus 
implying the inability to predict the course of the future. Second, he states that events of this 
nature will have significant effects and will often modify the trajectory of the host country. 
This could result in increased safety and security measures or critical political, social and 
economic instability. The third and final characteristic of a Black Swan event is that in spite of 
its outlier status, it is within human nature to contrive explanations and reasoning for the event 
after its occurrence. By doing so, this typically makes the event explainable, approachable and 
predictable. Taleb notes this as Narrative Fallacy, and is often a false perspective used when 
attempting to approach high impact, low probability events (2007:xvii-xviii).  
Taleb believes that the combination of a large impact, low predictability characteristics within 
a particular scenario is essentially what makes a Black Swan event too complicated to account 
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for, approach and mitigate. In addition to this, he mentions that one of the key reasons a Black 
Swan event is unpredictable is that most risk analysts and prominent decision-makers in 
investing will provide a working definition of ‘risk’ that excludes the possibility of a Black 
Swan. With the failure to consider a conceptualisation of PRA that combines the intelligence 
of events of this nature, methods surrounding its opperationalisation will seemingly fail. 
Furthermore, Taleb continues to build his theory by saying that sociologists and economists 
have always confidently produced 30 year predictions surrounding the price of oil and social 
security deficits however, their errors have been significant. He describes that although the 
magnitude of these forecast errors should be unquestionably accounted for, it is more 
disconcerting that risk analysts and decision-makers are unaware of these large 
miscalculations. He considers this to be a dire form of aggressive ignorance that seemingly 
infiltrates into the cognitive processes and strategy developments of risk analysts, which 
ultimately triggers a Black Swan event (2007: xx).  However, Jervis (2010:481) mentions that 
the characteristics which constitute a Black Swan event, as proposed by Taleb, are too vague. 
He expands on this by saying that people have different goals and expectations in their business 
ventures, so whilst an event of this nature may affect some, it is not to say that it will affect all. 
By this, the nature of the event, the perspective analysed from as well as the environment should 
be considered before classifying it as a Black Swan event.    
Taleb makes mention that the way in which a Black Swan event is established is through the 
learning of its causal factors. He states that the methodology employed by forecasting considers 
the ‘normal’ and expected outcomes with too much certainty, whereas the Black Swan in its 
nature is the opposite of such. This he calls the Platonic mind-set. He explains this concept as 
the gap between what risk analysts and decision-makers think they know versus what they 
actually know. It is therefore within this widening gap that the Black Swan is produced 
(2007:xxv). Taleb then claims that the world is intrinsically dominated by the extreme, the 
unknown and the improbable. However there is too much consideration focused on the known 
and the repeated and therefore, despite the increase in accessible knowledge, the future will 
become less predictable (2007:xxviii).  
Taleb draws on the limitations of the human mind, stating that risk analysts and decision-
makers have a warped understanding of world occurrences and therefore do not realise how 
complicated matters may be. Secondly, the human mind provides a retrospective distortion in 
that an assessment of the matters after the fact takes place. This is where a large consideration 
on the historical context is made giving the illusion that the matter seems clearer. Lastly, he 
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mentions that the over-evaluation of factual information and those who have the authority to 
analyse and plan around these results has a significant impact on how the Black Swan develops 
and the kind of effects it may have (2007:8).  
Taleb then considers the models and strategies used by risk analysts stating that the same 
importance is assigned to the same set of circumstances. When contemplating these models, 
risk analysts compartmentalise factors and outcomes to such a point where it becomes 
definitive and the malleability of these boundaries is ignored. With this intensive 
categorisation, he indicates that risk analysts reduce the significance of these potential events 
and therefore automatically overlook the indicators pointing to a Black Swan (2007:15-16). 
However, it is argued that other academics may consider this to be a failed method of approach 
in need of revision and optimisation. But Taleb claims that it is those involved in risk 
management and decision-making who become the creators of Black Swan events (2007:18). 
Lee, Preston and Green (2012:vii) claim that contingency plans developed by risk analysts 
often assumes the status quo ante (or the previously existing state of affairs) after a crisis. Poor 
evaluation and foresight are what provides the onset of high impact, low probability events. 
However, Taleb mentions that the reason why analysts in PRA are unable to approach Black 
Swans is due to a psychological and biological blindness of the mind, thus the problem does 
not lie in the nature of these events but rather in the way in which they are perceived and 
accounted for.  
In contrast to the blindness proposed by Taleb, Morris (2017) from a geopolitical intelligence 
platform Stratfor, argues that the conditions for a Black Swan event taking place have more 
than likely already been set. This again opposes Taleb’s theory as he claims that events such 
as these are formed from slow-motion triggers.  Morris gives the example of Martin Luther 
nailing the petition on the door of a Catholic Church in Wittenberg, Germany13 in 1517. This 
may have seemed as though this occurrence bore the characteristics of a Black Swan event, 
that the Protestant movement was inevitable. He said that, because the current social and 
                                                          
13 Martin Luther instigated the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century, challenging the religious, political, 
intellectual and cultural components that formed the axis of the Catholic Church. This reformation would result 
in the reorganisation of the beliefs, structures and politics in Europe that would continue into the modern era. 
Luther argued for a religious and political redistribution of power (as church and state were not separated) which 
resulted in the triggering of wars, persecutions and a counter-reformation from the Catholic Church (The 
Reformation, 2018).     
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political circumstances required a largescale transformation, someone else, if not Martin 
Luther, would have pioneered this movement.  
Additionally, Morris (2017) puts forward in a second writing on the establishment of Black 
Swan events, that forecasters, when they have accurately considered the historical and 
sociological contexts of the time, would have been able to distinctly see that conditions for 
such a movement where inevitable. One of the first tell-tail signs of this, is that during the 16th 
century it was not uncommon for people to nail their plights to the doors of churches. This 
would have received some sort of acknowledgement and perhaps action, but due to the severity 
of Luther’s claims, it resulted in a more momentous series of events. Morris goes on to explain 
that although globalisation has established interconnectivity and accessible information from 
open-sourced data bases, forecasters should not only consider historical evidence to build a 
case in approaching a Black Swan.  Analysis should therefore consider both similarities and 
differences. By having a certain understanding of the necessary actors and factors regarding 
sensitive circumstances, he proclaims that the inevitability of these events can result in 
successful identification and approach (2017).   
Furthermore, Morris confronts the claim that risk analysts and decision-makers have the ability 
to encourage the formation of a Black Swan event. He does this by saying that because the 
event itself was bound to take place, no individual decision or level of ignorance would derail 
the formation of the Black Swan. This suggests that because it occurs at the hands of a 
perpetrator, a Black Swan event can be successfully approached. Morris critiques the claims of 
Taleb by mentioning that Black Swans are made and can be accurately forecast when 
considering the historical, political, social and economic conditions of the time. He states that 
Black Swan events are not “born”, in that their occurrence cannot take place so randomly, but 
rather they are created and therefore can be approached by considering the indicators of their 
creation (2017).   
Bremmer and Keat (2009:2) present an alternative to the Black Swan known as the Fat Tail. 
This they define as the bulges which are found at the tail end of distribution curves that measure 
risk and their impact. This is the representation of risk that a particular event may occur, 
appearing to be catastrophic, unlikely to happen and difficult to predict. They claim that events 
such as these are ignored more often than not. Additionally, they mention that there is a variety 
of different methods in which these events can be successfully approached, but that there is no 
singular formula for understanding and managing political risk and the effects thereof. They 
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consider the way in which Fat Tail events are managed, approached and mitigated is country, 
region and even industry specific. By doing so, it becomes apparent that Fat Tail events can be 
approached regardless of the minor conceptual differences to that of the Black Swan. Bremmer 
and Keat provide the example of Brazil whereby monitoring and evaluating the behaviour of 
political parties is a crucial element for an accurate forecast of policy outcomes and potential 
risks. Whereas in China the consideration and analysis of personal power dynamics within the 
Communist Party and elite factions is a crucial element to be considered in forecasting. 
However, although these tools are important and could be used when analysing other countries, 
this approach is country or industry specific. Thus the method will not have the same result in 
a forecast done on Saudi Arabia, whereby the politics and the effects thereof are a family matter 
and should be analysed from a different perspective. 
When considering risks and their potential impacts, Bremmer and Keat draw stark correlations 
between a Fat Tail event and a Black Swan. Here they state that when considering high impact 
events, it is assumed that political and social behaviours can be predicted with the same 
methods and strategies used to forecast financial irregularities and disturbances. They mention 
that these assumptions are often misleading as a majority of the risks which characterise the 
world today do not follow a normal distribution, but one that is significantly skewed. By this, 
they put forward the view that unexpected events happen more frequently than the statistical 
models would indicate. With this conceptualisation, Bremmer and Keat classify Fat Tail and 
Black Swans as one and the same. However, they believe that Fat Tails can be successfully 
approached, whereas Taleb claims that a Black Swan cannot. Below is a visual representation 
of a Fat Tail event to provide the reader with a comparative understanding between it and the 
Black Swan.  
Figure 2: A Visual Representation of a Fat Tail Event  
  Source: Bremmer, I & Keat, P. 2009:19.  
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Analysing the graph above, Bremmer and Keat (2009:19) represent the Fat Tail through a 
probability distribution. One can see that the ends of the curve are thin which signifies that 
events in those ranges are very unlikely to occur. These events are labelled as ‘freak events’ 
due to their unlikeliness in nature and resulting devastation (the Bolshevik Revolution in 191714 
and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 194115 are examples of this). The probability 
(as represented on the y-axis on the graph) indicates the likelihood of events taking place. The 
higher the probability, the more frequent and common these events are. On the x-axis, the 
confidence intervals of these events are represented. A confidence interval is the probability 
that a value will fall between an upper and lower bound of probability distribution. The higher 
the interval is, the more impact there will be on stocks and profitability. The confidence interval 
is thus used as a tool to measure uncertainty, whereby the higher the probability associated, the 
more certainty there is (Bedford & Cooke, 2003:4). Therefore, it can be said that Fat Tail 
events, which have a low probability but a high confidence interval, will seemingly result in 
large scale devastations.   
Although Bremmer and Keat make the correlation between Black Swan and Fat Tail events, 
they claim that Taleb’s theory and approach have significant limitations. They claim that 
organisations and MNE’s are more likely to experience the impact of frequent minor 
disturbances, such as corruption and strikes which have similar, if not larger impacts than a 
Black Swan event. Furthermore, they state that these risks can be predicted and their gradual 
effects can be measured over a period of time. In addition to this, they state that unlike financial, 
economic and environmental risks, political risks are generated by individuals. Individuals 
have specific, identifiable sets of motivations and limitations which therefore makes them 
predictable and not a Black Swan. They claim that it is possible to map these incentives and 
constraints, making it considerably easier to forecast downside risks (2009:20-21).   
                                                          
14 The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 signified the dismantling of Tsarist autocracy in Russia which then led to the 
formation and rise of the Soviet Union. Citizen dissatisfaction then lead to the surprising fall of Tsar Nicholas 
Romanov II, and the old regime was replaced with a provisional government, with the aim to consider the plights 
of the Russian people more closely (The Russian Revolution, 2018). This can be considered as an example of one 
of the primary Fat Tail or Black Swan events to take place in history.   
15 The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 (known as Operation Barbarossa), was one of the largest 
invasions in history. This invasion is considered to be one of the major turning points in the war as Adolf Hitler 
(leader of Germany) was determined to enslave the Slavic nation and exterminate the Jewish population. This 
therefore ignited what would later become known as the Holocaust, where more than six million Jews were 
killed (Operation Barbarossa, 2018). The invasion of the Soviet Union is considered by Bremmer and Keat as a 
Fat Tail event due to the magnitude of the invasion as well as the fact that this led to one of the largest genocides 
in history (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:12-13).       
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A determining factor for Fat Tail and Black Swan occurrences are the dynamics within the host 
country. Taleb (2007:33-34) mentions that the world can be divided into two categories, that 
being Mediocristan and Extremistan. He defines Mediocristan to be a utopian reality whereby 
risk analysts hope that uncertainties and irregularities can be easily identified and defined. This 
is where the bulk of the data for forecasting and approach strategies is gathered. However, he 
claims that the world operates primarily out of the Extremistan division and that all social, 
political and economic matters reside in this category. In Extremistan, he indicates that 
inequalities result in single observations impacting the aggregate by a disproportionate amount, 
therefore derailing the approach established by analysts, but often without their knowledge. 
Finding an average when considering events from Extremistan becomes challenging as Black 
Swan events depend much on a single observation rather than that of many. It is here where 
Taleb states that one measure has the capability to influence the trajectory, and that the data 
considered in this should never be accepted as final and substantial. The frameworks 
considered for events of Extremistan is where most of the Black Swan development takes place, 
but still should only be considered as an approximate.  
Similarly to this, Blyth (2010:452) acknowledges Taleb’s claims of Mediocristan and 
Extremistan and states that when the world is divided into these two categories, it allows for 
risk analysts to consider risk in one domain and uncertainty in another. This forms the bounds 
for his development of the Four Quadrants of Talebism (see table 1). Blyth discloses that risk 
occurs where there are visible outcome generators, resulting in thin tails and simple payoffs. 
This suggests that risk analysts are able to sample past data which converges into an accurate 
understanding of the events in question. Uncertainty, he mentions, occurs when there are non-
linear or invisible outcome generators at play. In is here where non-scalable risks, Fat Tails and 
Black Swans are developed. The author notes that Blyth agrees with Taleb in that he mentions 
that the world operates out of Extremistan, however the methods and strategies in PRA are 
only able to account for Mediocristan.  
Blyth mentions that although there is an increased interconnectivity between countries which 
have facilitated open-sourced data and intelligence, the best tools used to understand this may 
be the worst instruments in approaching these events (2010:453). He aims to remedy this 
information engineering problem, whereby too much historical consideration is undertaken 
without the ability to apply into correctly into the future, through a series of probabilities and 
equations. He mentions that by considering a statistical approach towards historical events in 
establishing how this may been used as an approach is seemingly what will allow for the 
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successful identification of a Black Swan.  Finally, he considers Narrative Fallacy not as a 
consequence of a Black Swan event, but that it should not be considered a fallacy as such. Here 
he claims that this narrative is what has and will save analysts and those involved from potential 
Black Swans (2010:462).  
However, Taleb interestingly notes that Extremistan does not always suggest a Black Swan 
event but that some events are indeed rare and consequential but are still somewhat predictable. 
Here, he names these as ‘near’ Black Swan events or ‘grey’ swans. These grey swans are 
predictable when risk analysts consider factual randomness. He explains factual randomness 
to be when analysts contemplate a series of facts and figures but still acknowledge that there is 
an element of randomness to the event. The potential consequences become increasingly clear 
and therefore the impact of the surprise is significantly reduced. Taleb notes the stock market 
crash of 1987 as an example by saying that if economists know that there is a possibility of 
such an event taking place again, it cannot be considered as a Black Swan. Similarly, if a world 
war as great as World War II has happened once, a zero probability cannot be given when 
contemplating the risk of another, within relative bounds and reason (2007:271-272). Taleb 
then concludes on the grey swan by saying that those involved in the specific area of impact in 
which the event takes place, should essentially know about its development and be forthcoming 
with an approach.        
In contrast to this, Blyth (2010:462) investigates Taleb’s claim on grey swans by stating that if 
risk analysts are disinclined to see this information in front of them due to a lack of adequate 
data, then grey swans are centrally equivalent to a Black Swan. He mentions that if grey swans 
are predictable and forecastable, then so should Black Swans. Taleb argues that those involved 
in the domain of the event have seen it but everyone else is blind to it, but Blyth challenges this 
as a fundamental contradiction of the characteristics of the Black Swan event. According to 
Taleb, a Black Swan should occur as a surprise to all, not only to those who it does not affect. 
However, Blyth claims that the reality of a Black Swan event depends on the perspective from 
which it is considered.  
Likewise, Lindaas and Pettersen (2016:1232) propose that forecasting is not only possible but 
useful when contemplating a Black Swan world. They make a significant claim in saying that 
no events are so irrevocably unpredictable that they become a Black Swan. In their writings, 
they contest the fact that these swans are ‘black’. The contest that Black Swans are surprising 
and have disastrous impacts by claiming that there are definite methods which allow for their 
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‘de-blackening’. Here they consider the outlier characteristic of the event and assert that by 
widening the domain of where Black Swan events occur to include unknown known and 
unknown unknown events, that this will allow for an easier identification and successful 
approach (2016:1233). Moreover, they inspect the conceptualisation of the Black Swans 
unknown unknown trait by saying that if this means that there are no previous experiences 
pointing to its occurrence, there cannot be expectations surrounding the event. When this is 
taken into consideration, giving Black Swan events unknown unknown status, thus defies the 
understanding of what it means to be an outlier.  
In addition to this, Lindaas and Pettersen mention that a Black Swan is only a Black Swan in 
the eyes of the beholder. An example given in reference to this is the 9/11 terrorist attack. Here 
they assert that although the event can be considered a Black Swan for the victims, it must be 
noted that it was not a Black Swan for the attackers. By this, they consider the perspectivism 
associated with these events and indicate that the event itself should be considered in relation 
to whom and when. Furthermore, they consider Aven’s conceptualisation of a Black Swan in 
that these events are directly related to ones beliefs and knowledge, thus suggesting the number 
of people experiencing the event will differ significantly. He goes on to say that sometimes an 
event is a Black Swan to the scientific community, however it bears no surprise or impact on 
the general global community. Moreover, they mention that through increased mechanisms of 
communication of the differing knowledge and beliefs, this will reduce the likelihood of a 
Black Swan event substantially. By making knowledge available to those who do not have 
access to intelligence, allows for the rarity of a Black Swan to occur (2016:1235-1236).        
Cornell (2012:1824) introduces the concept of a ‘Perfect Storm’ when contemplating the nature 
of high impact, low probability events. She mentions that perfect storms are different to a Black 
Swan in that it involves aleatory uncertainties, or randomness, whereas a Black Swan is made 
up of epistemic uncertainty (a lack of fundamental knowledge). Perfect storms should be noted 
as rare but known events that can be successfully approached through a range of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Although she acknowledges these conceptual differences, 
she claims that most scenarios are made up of a combination of these characteristics. 
Furthermore, Cornell (2012) puts forward that the occurrence of true perfect storms and Black 
Swans are extreme and that the rarity used to describe these events is an excuse for lack of 
proactive risk management. She mentions that when decision-makers approach scenarios, 
different types of information should be considered in order for models to remain successful. 
These strategies require long term observation and careful evaluation of their marginal and 
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conditional probabilities (2012:1827). By applying this method, models become increasingly 
successful and the unforseeability of the scenario is reduced. She concludes by saying that 
whether the event is considered as a perfect storm or a Black Swan, this cannot be an excuse 
in PRA to wait until a disaster happens to take safety measures and issue regulations against a 
predictable situation (2012:1831).     
When observing the approach to events, Aven (2013:45) considers that when risk analysts are 
considering a fair number of ‘swans’ (meaning the everyday, normal events that take place), 
this will more often than not point forecasters into the direction of a Black Swan. In his 
writings, Aven considers Lindley’s academic review (2008:42) which claims that the calculus 
of probability is an adequate measure for all kinds of uncertainty and randomness and therefore 
can be successfully used when approaching a Black Swan event. Additionally, Aven identifies 
another flaw in Taleb’s theory as he assumes that risk analysts consider all swans to be white 
when analysing risk. This means that PRA is comprised of only looking at what is normal and 
expected, without considering events of greater significance and impact. Furthermore, Lindley 
mentions that the idea and definition of a Black Swan should be considered as a non-issue. This 
is due to the fact that when considering risk, uncertainty and safety, risk analysts are able to 
essentially express the problems of unexpected events in relation to risk management in more 
precise terms and adjusted to the context at hand.  
However, Aven responds to Lindley’s claim by saying that the idea of the Black Swan cannot 
be considered as a non-issue as the concept is widely known in the sphere of risk and safety 
and therefore needs to be contemplated in PRA. However, he mentions that two out of the three 
defining characteristics of the Black Swan event needs to be satisfied in order for it to be 
considered as such. These characteristics are that (1) it is a rare event which (2) which results 
in extreme consequences. Both need to be present when attempting to classify the event as a 
Black Swan. He states that, although events can still have devastating impacts, the surprising 
nature is to be questioned. He gives the example of the Fukishima Daiichi nuclear disaster of 
2011 and says that although the event did result in destruction, the scientific community had 
access to the knowledge which, if utilised correctly, would have reduced the impacts 
significantly. By this, Aven takes issue with the fact that the risks presented were accepted as 
sufficient which therefore led to it being classified as a Black Swan. He claims that Black Swan 
events take place not as a result of knowledge availability and not being utilised effectively, 
but that nothing in one’s knowledge can convincingly point to its possibility (2013:47-48). 
Similarly, Taleb mentions that some companies/states will benefit from shocks more so than 
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others. He puts forward that even though events resulting in devastation may take place, those 
who are resource rich and have the capacity to rebuild have established mechanisms which 
ensure benefit even in shock and chaos. He calls this ‘antifragility’ as some are aware and 
prepared for the possibility of extreme events which allows them to profit even in disorder 
(Taleb, 2012:15).   
Bremmer and Keat (2009:24) acknowledge that there are structural differences when 
contemplating political risks and uncertainties. When accounting for these risks, unlike 
operational, credit or market risks, these risks are often unsystematic and therefore more 
difficult to address through quantitative methods. Political actors aim to constantly adapt to 
overcome the risks through legal methods and measures of security by developing methods of 
antifragility. It is through this that they put forward that once a risk is recognised, the nature of 
the said risk drastically changes. One of these proposed methods is scenario building whereby 
a collaborative process is undertaken, focusing on unthinkable circumstances and creative 
solutions. This approach traditionally does not consider statistical and probabilistic measures, 
but places a greater focus on the social elements contributing to risk (2009:26). 
An example of the utilisation of scenario building is when Pierre Wack, who led the first 
scenario planning group at the oil company, Shell Française, successfully argued that the 
existing planning system was flawed as it relied heavily on projections of past trends in oil 
production and consumption. In addition to this, he claimed that there needed to be a greater 
focus placed on Fat Tail or Black Swan events and that operations should be considered in 
accordance to their potential. These plans eventually allowed for Shell to approach the Oil 
Shock in 1973 with preparation and ease (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:27). More on these types of 
approach strategies will be discussed in the following chapter.  
2.3. Conclusion  
Looking at the presented literature on the conceptualisation of PRA, it can be determined how 
the primary conceptual developments have resulted in changes around the concepts of 
opperationalisation. This can be seen through the expansion of PRA into country risk, political-
security risk, operational risk, transfer risk and regional risks. Risk analysts have acknowledged 
the importance of not only economic and financial risks but have also realised that political and 
social factors should be heavily considered in their investigations. With a greater understanding 
of the specific risks relevant to a host country, this has allowed for an increased protection of 
business ventures and profit returns. Furthermore, it is important to consider the boundaries 
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within PRA and how this relates to risk versus uncertainty. Here, the various academic work 
contemplated considered quantitative and qualitative methods, which was primarily comprised 
of statistical and probabilistic methods. This was found to be dominating idea when 
deliberating the differences between forecasting and predicting risks, and how these methods 
may affect the credibility and success of an approach in PRA.  
The aim of this chapter was to understand the conceptual developments around PRA and how 
this has advanced to accommodate Black Swan theory. Although Taleb’s claim that an event 
of such rarity and devastation results in the inability for risk managers to successfully approach 
this event, other authors disagreed. The literature presented how both quantitative and 
qualitative methods were used to consider the plausibility of approaching unknown unknown 
events. Similarly, many authors mention that depending on the observer’s conceptualisation 
and perspective of risk and Black Swan events, with the utilisation of the relevant knowledge, 
events such as these can be approached and resolved. Although the limitations of approaching 
a Black Swan event has been widely recognised, authors speak on how Taleb’s theory is 
unrealistic when considering risks. This will be discussed in the following chapter, by 
considering approaches presented as critiques and alternatives to Taleb’s Black Swan theory.  
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CHAPTER THREE: CRTIQUES PRESENTED BY ALTERNATIVE – APPROACH 
MECHANISMS TO BLACK SWANS IN POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to consider the critiques of Black Swan theory put forward by other 
academics by presenting possible approach strategies to high impact, low probability risks. By 
doing so, alternative ways in which risk analysts are able to consider this kind of risk will 
demonstrate how high impact, low probability events can be foreseen and approached. Here 
the defining characteristic of Taleb’s Black Swan, being its inherently unpredictable nature will 
be challenged. It must be mentioned that it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of the 
possible approaches to high impact, low probability events and this chapter will therefore only 
consider those which the author deems as most valuable to the study. The authors mentioned 
are predominantly of the opinion that there cannot be an event so irrevocably rare and 
devastating to be considered as a Black Swan. Thus, what is presented in this chapter will either 
be determined as a critique of, an opposition to or an alternative to Taleb’s Black Swan theory. 
These will demonstrate how extreme risks can be approached in PRA and will therefore clarify 
the obscurity surrounding Black Swan events. By considering approaches to these high impact, 
low probability risks will become more digestible and approachable through PRA. In doing so, 
the applicability of the Black Swan as a classification of events in PRA is questioned.       
The emergence of high impact, low probability events have become increasingly prominent, 
shedding a new light on current understandings of risk and how this is operationalised. 
Examples of events that have led to this claim are the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Macondo Oil 
Spill of 201016 and the Fukishima Nuclear disaster in Japan. Situations of this profiling have 
become frequent and have therefore resulted in questioning how risk is perceived and how 
disruptive events are approached (Lee, Preston & Green, 2012:vii).  
Although there are surprising events which take place, the nature of risks today and the results 
thereof are ‘slow-motion’ in that they generate over a period of time. These slow-motion risks 
                                                          
16 The Macondo Oil Spill took place on the 20 April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, whereby a British Petroleum (BP) 
oil rig caught fire. High pressure methane gas from the oil well expanded into the drilling riser where it ignited 
and exploded. This caused the entire platform to be engulfed, resulted in 29 casualties and a total discharge of 
4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf. This is considered to be one of the largest industrial disasters to ever take 
place and is attributed to the gross negligence and reckless misconduct of BP. It has since then been declared 
that due to a series of small mistakes and judgements made by BP, that this is what resulted in the catastrophe 
(Meigs, 2016). When the correct methods and approach strategies are employed by PRA and executed by the 
MNE, this will significantly reduce the likelihood of these events or minimise their impact.           
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are more likely to have a greater severity and impact. Because of this characteristic, it allows 
for successful identification in PRA. This chapter will consider how this is done by presenting 
both quantitative and qualitative methods of identification employed in risk analysis, with a 
greater focus on the latter. Some of these strategies discussed use a combination of these 
methods in order to consider probability as well as circumstantial factors with the aim of 
refining how risk analysts approach scenarios. By doing so, the fundamental characteristics 
synonymous with a Black Swan event are critiqued and questioned.   
3.2. The Complexities of Risk in Political Risk Analysis    
Noting the conceptual developments that have taken place regarding risk and PRA (presented 
in chapter two), risk analysis has become increasingly robust. Governments and business had 
once been insufficiently prepared to confront high impact, low probability crises and failed to 
manage the economic, social and political consequences. Since then, risk analysts and decision-
makers have had to develop and implement overarching strategies which consider the actors, 
factors, time of event and location in order to cultivate preparedness and response capacities. 
By doing so, this has established a range of frameworks for risk response. In the midst of 
developing risks and trends, host governments have the responsibility to approach and mitigate 
the effects these may have on a society. However, sector specific responses are also needed in 
order to ensure the safeguarding of MNE’s and their profitability. Due to the nature of these 
events, approaches developed by risk analysts have had to become considerably specific in 
order to provide useful and relevant information to decision-makers (Lee, Preston & Green, 
2012:vii). This is how high impact, low probability events can become manageable foreseeable 
and approachable in PRA.  
Lee, Preston and Green (2012) mention that the approach strategies will remain largely the 
same for hurricanes, earthquakes or terrorist attacks such as 9/11. The similarities that can be 
found through these events allow risk analysts to approach them with relative simplicity 
(2012:xi). With the coherency presented by these strategies, and approaches towards high 
impact, low probability events, the element of surprise and the issue of Narrative Fallacy can 
become significantly reduced.  It is important for political risk analysts to present strategies to 
governments and stakeholders that are robust and resilient in their approach towards high 
impact, low probability events. This chapter will consider how authors have met complexities 
and extreme risks by presenting critiques on the Black Swans unpredictability as well as 
possible alternatives. How these events have been considered and classified is evaluated.   
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3.3. Quantitative Approaches to Black Swans in Political Risk Analysis 
Although the methodology used in this study is qualitative, there are various quantitative 
approaches to high impact, low probability risks which have been discovered. The techniques 
used are mathematical and statistical in nature and are largely formulated through probabilistic 
methods. These must be acknowledged so to determine whether or not high impact, low 
probability events can be approached from both a qualitative and a quantitative perspective.   
3.3.1. Methods of Probability as an Approach  
Probability statements form the foundation for a majority of the qualitative approaches to high 
impact, low probability events in PRA. Many academics as well as risk analysts believe that 
assessing the magnitude and consequences attached to specific risks can only be effectively 
done through methods of probability. This provides the understanding and measurement of the 
likelihood of something to happen which allows stakeholders and governments to develop 
specific approach mechanisms and mitigation strategies. Because risk is determined by 
statistics and probability, those who employ these methods believe that the element of surprise 
and the limitations of Narrative Fallacy are significantly reduced as barriers towards 
approaching risks and their impacts. These probabilistic methods in risk will be discussed 
further below.   
Kaplan and Garrick (1980:11) mention that risk analysts and decision-makers are not able to 
avoid risk but are only able to choose between them. Alongside rational decision-making, they 
claim that a non-negotiable requirement of risk assessment is a quantitative strategy. This will 
provide a way of expressing risk so that it can be properly and specifically weighed, along with 
all the other related costs and benefits, in the response process. Kaplan and Garrick make use 
of a list of possible scenario outcomes. Each of these scenario outcomes consist of sub-
categories which are representative of further possible results to the risk in question (1980:14-
15). By narrowing down the possible outcomes, it is able to satisfy the uncertainty related to 
risk. These possible outcomes are arranged in order of increasing severity or damage and are 
assigned a probability weighting (1980:17). By consolidating probability with the likelihood 
of an outcome, they believe that political risk analysts are able to advise governments and 
stakeholders on the possibility of Black Swan events. This method can be considered as a 
critique to the Black Swans unpredictability as well as an alternative way in which to approach 
risk. Here, Kaplan and Garrick believe that risk analysts are able to identify and approach Black 
Swan events with a relative amount of certainty. However, a concern regarding any method 
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based on probability is that it is unable to identify data which cannot be numerically captured. 
It is often this data which contains the most valuable information regarding the intricacies 
leading to possible Black Swans. Therefore, methods of probability run the risk of failing to 
consider vital information that may defer high impact, low probability events in PRA.    
Another probabilistic based approach is the Monte Carlos Simulation. This is an analysis done 
by determining the impact of identified risks by running various simulations in order to identify 
the range of possible outcomes for a number of scenarios. Random sampling is performed by 
using uncertain risk variable inputs (this is also known as ‘what-if’ scenarios) to generate the 
range of outcomes with a specific confidence measure for each of these. Although the 
simulation process is highly complex, the calculations are presented in simple graphs and 
tables. These results approximate the full range of possible outcomes and the likelihood of 
each, allowing for adequate approach and response strategies to be determined. When the 
Monte Carlos Simulation is applied to risk assessments, risks appear as a frequency distribution 
graph which is similar to the bell-curve, allowing for non-statisticians to use and understand it 
intuitively (Smith, 1994). Mun (2006:vii) considers risk and the outcomes thereof to be a ‘black 
box’ in that there is large-scale uncertainty with high impacts, which can only become 
‘transparent’ (identifiable and approachable) through the application of the Monte Carlos 
Simulation to real life scenarios in order to model risk adequately. Because of this transparency 
provided by the Monte Carlos analysis, this opposes Taleb’s proposed unpredictability of high 
impact, low probability events.  Furthermore, this approach allows political risk analysts to 
understand the impact of specified risk and uncertainty within forecasting models and to 
respond accordingly. The simulations allow for the identification of multiple risk descriptors 
which provide the insight into how high impact, low probability events may be approached. 
The Monte Carlos Simulation can therefore be considered as an alternative method to approach 
extreme risks or high impact, low probability events in PRA.   
Other classic probabilistic methods in risk analysis include, Bell Curves, Bayesian Model 
Averaging, Engineered Risk Management and Knowledge Probability.  These methods will be 
further discussed below. Although Taleb steadily believes that not only is there no way to 
forecast or approach a Black Swan event, he especially makes mention of the fact that methods 
of probability are intrinsically flawed in doing so (2007:45). However, many risk analysts 
believe the Bell Curve has provided the platform to analyse and approach Fat Tail events as 
well as to understand potential outcomes (Jervis, 2010:482). Taleb therefore fails to 
acknowledge that these approaches allow for risk analysts and decision-makers to understand 
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different impulses and variables which are at work as precursors to high impact, low probability 
events. Jervis notes these to be ‘triggers’ to an even which is anticipated (2010:482). The 
presence of these impulses or triggers disqualifies the outlier status of a Black Swan event, 
therefore meaning that high impact, low probability events in PRA can be determined in 
advance. These triggers allow for political risk analysts and decision-makers to begin the 
forecasting process of high, medium or low impact events and are present in both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches.  
A popular method used in approaches is the Bayesian Model Averaging. This method of 
approach is a weighted model output in accordance with the probabilities of being correctly 
based on contingency with the data presented. The model considers a variety of approaches but 
in accordance to with weighted accuracy. The data determines the nature and course of the 
model rather than the model determining the type of data used and analysed. In doing so, 
because it is the data collected which determines the model and approach, the prospect of an 
accurate forecast and approach increases. Bayesian Model Averaging is therefore the statistical 
data formulated by the likelihood of occurrence. This dynamic method of approach which 
combines the technique of forecasting reduces prediction errors in two main ways. Firstly, it 
considers a variety of variables and models which are usually more accurate than an individual 
component and secondly, analysts are significantly less likely to make dramatically incorrect 
forecasts.  There is an analysis of the data which constantly influences variables, therefore 
adjusting how one should approach a circumstance. By doing so, it provides consistency and 
accuracy for political risk analysis and decision makers (Montgomery, Hollenbach & Ward, 
2011:2-3).  
Bayesian Model Averaging can be considered as an alternative method in how high impact, 
low probability events can be approached, as it identifies models and variables which increase 
its forecast accuracy. This method is founded on the analysis of a significant amount of data, 
however it is critiqued that probabilistic methods fail to consider human nature and practical 
knowledge. This is primary Black Swan territory as put forward by Taleb and so by neglecting 
this means that risk analysts will continue to fail in identifying and approaching these events.   
Engineered Risk Management (ERM) is another probabilistic approach to events in PRA. This 
approach has been designed to provide an in-depth analysis of the system, its functions and the 
probabilities of its failures. By doing so, the model automatically evaluates itself, improving 
and increasing robustness. The structure of this model is based on trees and fault trees 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
(otherwise known as influence diagrams) and an assessment of the outcome of the different 
scenarios. This method is one which analyses the possible failures of the approach strategies in 
order for alternatives to be established. The data collected and analysed is comprised from 
existing information, surrogate data, test data and expert opinion. Due to the wide consideration 
of various types of data in this method, it is able to present prospective benefits, costs and risks. 
In addition to this, ERM considers human behaviour and errors as they are often basic causes 
of accidents which may provoke the further development of high impact, low probability 
events. These errors are rooted in management decisions such as the linking the physical 
performance of the models to the decisions executed, training practices and even incentives. 
By analysing these factors in the approach, risk analysts are able to provide a more complete 
assessment of the failure risks and how this may affect business trajectories (Cornell, 
2012:1826-1827).  
Furthermore, the ERM approach is conducted through the long-term observation of risk factors, 
variables and threats which provide an assessment of their marginal and conditional 
probabilities. This increases the chances of identifying possible risks which may lead to high 
impact, low probability events. Decision-makers and government stakeholders are thus able to 
implement systems of risk management strategies before the emergence of an event of this 
nature. Black Swans have been determined by Taleb as an unknown unknown, or priori (being 
deductive in nature) but as presented by ERM, signals or triggers emerge and can be observed 
and interpreted in order to permit a fast reaction. This can also be considered as an alternative 
method in which to approach high impact, low probability events. Taleb uses the 9/11 Terrorist 
attack as a prime example which encompasses all three of the major defining characteristics of 
a Black Swan event, but Cornell mentions that Phillip Zelikov the director of the 9/11 terrorist 
attack commission, called the misreading of the precursors to this event a ‘failure of 
imagination’. Although the impacts of this attack were severe, there have been similar attacks 
which have involved the use of aeroplanes. Some of these examples will be mentioned later on 
in the study. Zelikov implies that because of this, events of a similar nature should have been 
analysed which could have resulted in the prevention of the 9/11 attacks. Cornell also says that 
PRA and management in cases such as this, involve updating the chances of failure, an 
accident, or an attack based on diverse observations. This reinforces protection and robustness 
of the system, meaning that the element of surprise and devastation is minimised should a high 
impact, low probability event occur (2010:1828). These observations and imaginative factors 
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add an element of knowledge to methods of probability and allow increased alertness, quick 
detection and early response to possible high impact, low probability events.    
Taleb, however, claims that often these models presume a framework which does not consider 
outlier variables, resulting in a Gaussian Reality and therefore the variables and indicators 
considered are irrelevant (2010:234). However, Aven remedies this by saying that by adding a 
knowledge component to a probability statement increases forecast accuracy. The example 
used to express this method was a terrorist attack, when 21 year old Andres Breivik executed 
two ‘lone-wolf’17 terrorist attacks in Norway in July of 2011. Both of these attacks were 
strategically done outside of governmental offices in retaliation to the Norwegian government. 
Breivik moved from the site of one terrorist attack to the other disguised as a policeman, 
presenting falsified identification allowing him to act unsuspectingly. Breivik is a right-wing 
extremist who believed that the government of Norway was directly responsible for creating a 
cultural suicide as a result of increased feminist and democratic thought. Furthermore, he 
believed that Islam and Marxism were the enemies of the state and that the Norwegian 
government was not being active enough in preventing their development in the country. The 
attacks resulted in a number of deaths and casualties, making it the largest attack on the 
country’s soil since World War 2 (Ranstorp, 2013:88).     
Although situations like ‘lone-wolf’ terrorism, conditions cannot be explicitly repeated, risk 
analysts are able to use a knowledge based probabilistic approach. This knowledge probability 
is subjective and judgemental and expresses the uncertainty and degree of belief as to whether 
or not an occurrence of this type will take place. Here a specific group of people will assign a 
value according to how likely or unlikely the event will be. It will then be possible to identify 
events that have a higher impact and lower probability. With the example given on the terrorist 
attacks, the relevant police security services could have based their judgements on many 
assumptions concerning the capabilities and motivations of persons to perform the attack. By 
doing so, police and security personnel would have been better prepared for an event such as 
this. The difference between classic probabilistic risk strategies and this one is that the 
knowledge component cannot be assigned a numerical value. This method of approach 
                                                          
17 A ‘lone-wolf’ terrorist attack is conducted by a single person. The person acts alone in the preparation and 
execution of violent attacks and has no material help from any specific group. He/she may affiliate themselves 
to the beliefs and ideologies of a group but does not act in affiliation with them. Additionally, no group will claim 
responsibility for the attack (Ranstorp, 2013:88).   
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therefore allows probability statements to encompass the component of practical knowledge 
that cannot be determined by probabilities (Aven, 2013:46).  
Additionally, by incorporating a knowledge component into an approach strategy, it establishes 
a robustness about the model. Political risk analysts are therefore able to identify actors and 
factors that may have been overlooked through quantitative methods. If risk analysts consider 
the generic factors which lead to a terrorist attack (for example, extremist behaviour, ethnic 
conflict or societal dissatisfaction), one is able to determine similarities. It is these similarities 
which provide the context towards an approach unexclusive in developing strengthened police 
and security systems, assisted decision-making and through specified scenario building. Aven 
(2010:48) mentions that the issue of anticipating and approaching a Black Swan event is not 
because there is insufficient knowledge, but that risk analysts and decision-makers do not 
expand on this unsolicited information. By this, the idea of a Black Swan event can be 
minimised in relation to risk and security measures. The way in which risk is conceptualised 
and the knowledge used to identify this by risks analysts will be discussed further later in the 
chapter.    
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Global Security Insight (GSI) are both 
computerised programmes which link data to geography. GIS is a tool which analyses, stores, 
manipulates and visualises geographic information, usually presented in the form of a map. 
This is done by creating geographic data by risk analysts asking high-level questions which 
will guide the obtaining of the correct data. This is then managed, analysed and presented 
geographically so that decision-makers and stakeholders are able to identify the range of impact 
or the potential location of the crisis and how they are able to respond. Both of these approaches 
consider risk and potential events such as terrorist attacks, crime, civil unrest as well as 
kidnappings. The spatial thinking used operates as a decision-making assist to governmental 
stakeholders and MNE’s in how to approach, respond and mitigate risks. These systems, which 
are employed by risk and political risk and security companies such as S-RM, Control Risks 
and Oxford Economics, consider these factors and variables, rating their likelihood and severity 
numerically. By doing so, their clients are able to visualise the severity of the impact and 
therefore approach it effectively (GISGeography, 2018). GIS and GSI approaches can be 
considered as an alternative way in which to approach extreme risks.     
Sottilotta (2017:57) claims that when risk is translated into numbers, it provides a summary of 
the complexities involved. By amending the data so that it becomes more accessible to risk 
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analysts and stakeholders, it removes assumptions and ambiguity. This creates connections, 
allowing the data to become mobilised and actionable in favour of approach strategies used by 
the actors involved. Although she considers that probability provides some clarity in the 
numbers, this can often be an illusion. Translating socio-political variables into measurable 
entities entails precise epistemological and methodological assumptions, leading to large 
deficits in results in PRA. She suggests that this is how the potential of Black Swans are missed 
through PRA. By this, Sottilotta encourages risk analysts to consider more qualitative approach 
strategies to risk and uncertainties.    
Probability has formed the foundation for many approaches in PRA and business intelligence. 
By considering methods such as the Bell-Curve and the like, analysts are able to forecast with 
significant accuracy the results and impacts of risks. A professor in business statistics, business 
forecasting and derivative developments of the Business School at Stellenbosch University 
says that not only are methods of probability able to be successfully used in business, that these 
approaches can also be applied to understand events in the political and social arenas. An 
example he uses is how close quantitative methods are able to forecast the increase or decrease 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country and the effects this may have on a country’s 
credit rating, business outcomes, investor responses and even its social stability (Interview with 
Business Statistics Professor, July 2018). However, as it has been presented, probabilistic 
approaches run the risk of missing variables and factors based on the practical, real-life 
knowledge. This issue in PRA can be remedied through the qualitative approach and 
forecasting methods and strategies.  
By considering these approaches, alternatives to approaching extreme risks and potential Black 
Swan events in PRA can be seen. By doing so, this exposes a wider range of risks that should 
be acknowledged in order for PRA to remain robust. These alternatives can be considered as 
critiques to the fact that Taleb considers Black Swan events to be inherently unpredictable. By 
these qualitative methods, risk analysts are able identify and strategically move towards high 
impact, low probability events. This proving that the way Black Swans are conceptualised and 
understood has an impact on how they are approached. This is of critical importance.         
3.4. Qualitative Approaches to Black Swans in Political Risk Analysis  
Qualitative research methods place an emphasis on in-depth knowledge collected from a 
variety of case studies. By doing so, risk analysts are able to identify and work from 
generalisations about phenomena’s as a whole (Burnham, Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 
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2008:41). These strategies utilised focus on determining and analysing variables and factors 
which are often missed through quantitative methods. Quantitative methods in PRA allow risk 
analysts to consider risks and their impacts by paying specified attention to related issues and 
difficulties surrounding risk communication. Risk communication allows for the conditions 
surrounding high impact, low probability events to be effectively approached and overcome 
more so than through quantitative methods (Wardman & Mythen, 2016:1220). This will be 
expanded on below by presenting alternatives to the risk approach through qualitative methods.    
3.4.1. Increased Methods of Communication and Diplomacy  
Wardman and Mythen mention that one of the crucial ways in which to rectify the difficulties 
resulting from ‘anticipatory solutions’ to ‘foresighted problems’, is that there needs to be a 
more holistic approach to risk. They suggest that this can be done by decentring the current 
focus on short-term security outcomes common to uncritical responses to Black Swan events. 
Furthermore, in order to do this, risk analysts and decision-makers should approach risk 
communication through ‘Adaptive Governance’ principles. This would expand the scope, 
logics and capacities of organised risk responses when confronting high impact, low probability 
events (2016:1221). They mention that one of the main principles of this approach is through 
the increased distribution of information. The information surrounding risk is gathered and 
shared, which allows for the organisation and efficient response to risks. The wide dispersal of 
this information means that risks are constituted across locations and different relational forms 
allowing for successful forecasting (Wardman, 2008:1620). The increased communication 
allows risk analysts to understand how people may appraise and respond to these risks, 
providing an integral strategy for planning future action and managing and responding to events 
as they may occur. Furthermore, increased information and communication introduces the 
reinforcement of regulations and procedures which will improve safety measures and risk 
related conducts (Wardman & Mythen, 2016:1223).  
In addition to this, the authors consider adaptive principles approach to be done with more 
expansive data and a conducted agenda, focusing on process-driven forecasting. In their 
analysis, they present high impact, low probability events to be ones which are slow-motion 
and are therefore constantly changing (Hardy & Maguire, 2016:91). By identifying these slow 
moving triggers and through increased risk communication, the impact of these events could 
be drastically alleviated (Wardman & Mythen, 2016:1226). The authors state that extreme risks 
are formed through slow motion triggers and can be considered as a critique of Taleb’s theory. 
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The triggers allow for the identification of possible high impact, low probability events, 
suggesting that an approach can be established.       
Similarly, Klinke and Renn (2012:280) mention that adaptive approaches to high impact, low 
probability events should include a dynamic process of continuous and gradual learning, which 
includes and is guided by different values and frames of reference. Secondly, it should include 
interdisciplinary risk and concern assessments incorporating natural, technical and social 
science perspectives. Thirdly, there should be an assessment of the limits within the knowledge, 
finding a ‘common ground’ to resolve the ambiguities and complexities. Lastly, there should 
be a focus placed on the selection and implementation of policies subject to ongoing 
monitoring. This aids the adjustment of calibrated responses. Furthermore, organisations and 
stakeholders which incorporate regular dialogue with local actors when developing and 
maintaining their foresight policies are able to better position themselves in anticipation and 
approach for high impact low probability events. By establishing good relationships, a greater 
level of cooperation is fostered and the operational responses to such events are better equipped 
(Coombs, 2013:56).   
Additionally, Bremmer and Keat consider environmental shaping to be a key strategy in 
approaching high impact risks. Taleb mentions how Black Swan events are all-encompassing 
in their impact and devastation, regardless of industry however, Bremmer and Keat mention 
that by understanding the industry and the environment in which it is found, stakeholders and 
MNE’s are able to shape the trajectory of their business significantly. Organisations are able to 
do this by influencing lobby legislatives for a more favourable regulation, thus mitigating any 
potential risks which may affect the business. Furthermore, the authors claim that by 
communicating with and forging alliances with local stakeholders and citizens, they are able 
to win their support which will positively influence business operations. This can be seen 
through the work and local investment made by the mining company Anglo-American which 
has spent a large amount of money in several countries to help shape the public perceptions of 
its work. These local investments include support for community activities, arts and education. 
This helps maintain friendly relations with local and political leaders and thus creates an 
environment whereby disputes which may escalate into high risks with large impacts, are 
quickly resolved (2009:32). This method of communication, partnered with local investing 
allows for organisations to influence their business environments in such a way that shapes 
potential risks and the impact thereof. By doing this, an alternative way in which to shape risk 
and the effects, it allows for better understanding of how to conduct an approach.  
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Jervis (2010:484-485) considers this to be a form of diplomacy which organisations can use in 
approaching the risks of the respective host environments. He mentions that because people act 
and make decisions based on biases or fallible views of others, this creates complications and 
increases risks and the impacts thereof. Beliefs and behaviours are key factors in the 
formulation of high impact, low probability events and by understanding these alongside the 
nature of such events can aid approach strategies. He gives the example of a war ensuing, 
stating that if actors are aware of and expect certain conditions will lead to a war, and if they 
believe that there is nothing that can be done to stop this from occurring, then they will act in 
a way that will bring about the war. Jervis furthermore claims that if political actors are aware 
of the typical factors which lead to a war such as when a weaker state grows rapidly and begins 
to annex another, or when a more developed country uses its strength to provoke a weaker 
country, or if the war is seen as a costly venture for both parties, this is where diplomacy can 
be used to approach a war.  
Violent conflicts, including ethnic conflicts, are not unavoidable but can be prevented and the 
impacts mitigated through methods of prevention such as increased methods of diplomacy. 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2016:150-151) state that relevant actors should consider 
specific interventions that may prevent high impact, low probability events. Reasoning through 
diplomacy allows actors to anticipate and avoid an undesired outcome. By acknowledging the 
conditions which need to be present for a particular event to take place allows for actors 
involved to approach it relatively successfully. Furthermore, by considering how often these 
conditions take place in similar kinds of events enables actors to understand a pattern of triggers 
and outcomes, permitting anticipation which means that people will act differently. By this, the 
event is then foreseen and cannot be classified as a Black Swan. These patterns and events can 
be built into specific models of scenario building and early warning signals.  
3.4.2. Scenario Building and Early Warning Signals  
Taleb mentions that the crux of a Black Swan event is that nothing in history can point to its 
existence and occurrence, especially ‘precise Black Swans’. Here these ‘precise Black Swans’ 
are considered to be events which are foreseen with each detail being accurately predicted, 
suggesting that the Black Swan has an element of forecastability and approach (2007:208). 
This apparent paradox is considerably important when contemplating the possibilities of 
approaching risks in PRA as well as Black Swan events, and how its ‘outlier’ status can be 
reviewed.    
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One such method in which these ‘outlier’ factors of high impact, low probability events are 
accounted for and approached in PRA is through scenario building and early warning signals. 
This method of approach covers the interaction between risks and any other possible 
developments, whether they have a positive or negative impact on the situation at hand 
(Assessment Capabilities Project, 2016:2). Although there are different methodologies when 
comprising specific scenarios, it involves eight general steps. The main objective of scenario 
building is to inform strategic decision-making by considering a range of variables and 
indicators. By identifying and analysing alternatives, as well as accommodating egregious 
factors an approach to high impact, low probability events can be formulated and executed.     
The first of these that a focal issue should be identified. Here a specific question about the 
future an organisation may be confronting is analysed. Secondly, driving forces need to be 
recognised. The driving forces represent key variables and their trends in the macro 
environment which influence the focal issue in question. Some of the drivers may be the 
demographics of a country, socio-political drivers, cultural and religious drivers and economic 
drivers (Puget Sound Future Scenarios, 2008:1-2).  Thirdly, these drivers need to be ranked in 
importance and in their level of uncertainty.  This step directs the outcome of the final set of 
scenarios as the two most important and uncertain drivers identified will determine the most 
divergent and relevant future conditions. The fourth step is to select the scenario logics by 
exploring the interactions of the most uncertain and important drivers so that alternative frames 
are created. This is how a divergent, yet plausible scenario is established. Next is to flesh out 
the scenarios and then select indicators to monitor. Each scenario is developed by exploring 
the implications of alternative trajectories and how this may affect the end result. After this, a 
set of indicators which should be monitored are selected in order to assess the implications of 
alternative futures based on the focal issue.  Using these selected indictors, planners will assess 
how the focal issue is impacted under each scenario. Lastly, an assessment of alternative 
strategies is conducted (Puget Sound Future Scenarios, 2008:3-4).  
A professor, specialising in political economy, international relations, global health and public 
policy at the University of Stellenbosch mentions that scenario building is a key technique in 
analysing potential high impact events. They have worked on a number of scenario projects 
between 2003 and 2005 for a United Nations AIDS mission in Africa alongside the oil company 
Royal Dutch Shell and considers these high impact, low probability events to be “wild cards” 
(Interview with International Relations professor, July 2018). He mentions how the 
methodology of scenario building can be applied to any particular event - fiscal, political, 
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natural, biochemical or health related scenarios and that it is not an industry specific approach. 
Although he mentions that room must be made for potential high impact, low probability events 
or wild cards within scenario building, he states how it is possible to forecast these unforeseen 
events with a considerably amount of accuracy. By being able to acknowledge and account for 
these wild cards places into question the outlier status of Black Swan events as proposed by 
Taleb. If risk analysts and decision- makers are able to identify extreme variables or wild cards, 
it can no longer be determined as an outlier and the issue of Narrative Fallacy is eliminated. 
This can therefore be considered as an opposing view to Taleb’s developed theory on Black 
Swans. As the respondent stated, because wild card events can be identified, they will no longer 
come as a surprise, their devastation can be prepared for and Narrative Fallacy is dissolved.  
 
A similar approach to high impact, low probability events to that of scenario building is by 
identifying early warning signals. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2016:151-152) 
mention that there are two primary tasks when establishing early warning signals, the first being 
the type of event and location and, secondly, their progress should be monitored and assessed 
in order to know how close to violence and devastation it may be. This approach places a 
particular focus on fundamental indicators in relation to the type and location of the event as 
well as alongside a timeframe. Furthermore, the authors make mention of Ted Gurr’s work on 
finding indicators through his study, Minorities at Risk recognises three primary factors which 
affect the proneness of minority groups to rebel. These are; collective incentives, the capacity 
for joint action and external opportunities (Gurr, 2000:225-227). These indicators are justified 
through data sets which correlate the magnitude of civilian unrest from the following year. This 
allows the likelihood of such events taking place once again to be ranked in accordance and 
therefore can be approached correspondingly. From this perspective, conflict analysts are able 
to consider indictors from past occurrences as well as current factors in approaching high 
impact, low probability scenarios.      
 
Other models of early warning signals take place in the form of econometric forecasting which 
has been built around specific events. This approach considers political exclusion and 
horizontal inequalities when analysing the increasing risks for civil wars. By factoring in 
economic disparities, low income per capita and stagnant growth this increases civilian 
discontent and advances the likelihood of a civil war (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 
2013:136). Other academics have developed indicators, state failure, food crises and 
environmental devastation. Goldstone (2008:6-7) mentions that by combining models and 
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indicators, risk analysts and decision-makers are able to better forecast instability and other 
high impact, low probability events. He further mentions four particular indicators which were 
able to successfully forecast 80 per cent of the probability of specific countries experiencing 
political crises within a two year period. These indicators were regime type, infant mortality, 
high levels of discrimination and the presence of armed conflicts in neighbouring states. The 
determined outcomes of these indicators are revolutionary war, ethnic war, regime change and 
genocide, all of which have significant impacts but can be effectively approached when the 
correct factors and variables are considered.    
Ramsbotham et.al. (2016:153) are in agreement and state that by utilising qualitative methods 
to monitor potential high impact, low probability events offers vaster, more content rich 
contextual information than quantitative statistical analysis would.  When considering the 
occurrence of a conflict or scenarios of this nature, it is easier to forecast other similar events 
as a result due to their recurrent and protracted nature. By identifying and adequately analysing 
the correct actors and factors, approaching high impact, low probability events becomes more 
realistic. Through the consideration of these methods, it negates Taleb’s claim that transitions 
into crises or contagions cannot be predicted through PRA (2007:272). The thesis will present 
further approach strategies in how the outlier status of Taleb’s Black Swan is challenged by 
methods of imaginative thinking and prediction, the knowledge dimension and through rational 
thinking.  
3.4.3. Rational Thinking Strategies and the Conceptualisation of Risk  
Taleb mentions that one of the main reasons for the unpredictability of Black Swan events is a 
result of risk analysts and decision-makers’ learning with too much precision instead of 
observing events from a general perspective (2007:xxi). As mentioned, he calls this the platonic 
mind-set whereby what risk analysts think they know and what they actually know creates a 
fundamental gap whereby Black Swans find their niche environment to develop (2007:xxv). 
The fact that people think they are able to forecast such outliers and Black Swan events is the 
paramount reasoning for their epistemic ignorance (2007:165-166). However, Aven and Krohn 
(2013:1) mention that though the knowledge dimension, unforeseen and potential surprises can 
be better identified than what the traditional approaches allow for.  The authors mention that 
these traditional methods (being probabilistic based methods) in PRA are too narrow, ignoring 
and concealing important aspects of risks and uncertainties which could identify potential high 
impact, low probability events. They do not neglect the importance and value of methods of 
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probability, but they focus intently on the fact that without a knowledge component, 
probabilities will almost always fail.  
One of the pillars in this knowledge dimension is that of a conceptual framework. Aven and 
Krohn mention that in order to accurately assess and manage extreme risks, risk analysts need 
to see beyond probability statements and adopt a broader understanding of risk in order to 
capture outliers. There is an emphasis placed on the conceptualisation of risks and how they 
should be amended so that they are more relevant to the purpose of forecasting. New risk 
perspectives have established a sustainable foundation for the conceptualisation of high impact 
low probability events (2013:2). Aven and Krohn examine the rationale and type of knowledge 
used by risk analysts and decision-makers in PRA. Navigating the knowledge used in building 
models and approaches increases robustness and the visibility of potential high impact, low 
probability events.  
Aven and Krohn propose four basic fundamentals to aid the reconceptualisation of risk 
concepts and perspectives. The first of these is that a suitable risk conceptualisation needs to 
be formulated in order for the understanding, assessment and management of risk to be in line 
with the framework being utilised. This conceptualisation should incorporate the future 
consequence of the activity, by incorporating and understanding current hazards or threats. By 
doing so, the outcomes of these threats can be identified and therefore approached effectively 
(2013:8). Secondly, a suitable theory, basic principles and methods for the risk assessment 
should be found and placed in line with the reconceptualisation. This will allow for risks and 
their responses to be adequately developed and executed. Here the conceptualisation of risks 
will directly determine the opperationalisation of the models and approach strategies. Thirdly 
there should be a constant review of the concepts and ideas in consideration. This forms part 
of an evaluation process that is necessary in order to keep approaches and models robust (Aven 
& Vinnem, 2007:132). Through this quality discourse, outliers are highlighted and approaches 
can be refined. The final characteristic proposed is the incorporation of collective mindfulness. 
By increasing the mindfulness and willingness of organisations to be increasingly sensitive 
towards operations, committed to resilience and deference to expertise is considered as an 
effective approach mechanism in of itself. Collective mindfulness can be used as an effective 
instrument for managing risks, potential events and unforeseen factors as well as refining and 
keeping methods and approach strategies relevant and robust (Aven & Krohn 2013:2 & 
Khorsandi & Aven, 2013:873).  
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In accordance with the conceptualisation of risk and perspectives depending on the relevant 
variables and factors, Runde (2010:494) considers high impact, low probability events to be 
observer dependent. He explains that people may experience different events in different ways 
depending on the nature and the industry of the occurrence. However, Taleb proceeds on the 
basis of the common-sense assumption that there is a close enough connection between any 
event and the different ways people may experience and talk of it for it to be experienced in 
the same way (2007:53). The distinction between the conceptualisation of risk and ones 
knowledge about the event must be considered in the approach strategies developed as well as 
whether or not it can be labelled a Black Swan event. Therefore, it is the boundaries of what 
can be determined to be a Black Swan event that must be considered as different people 
belonging to different industries may experience, describe and interpret the same event in 
differently.   
Runde proposes the rational-expectations theory to be part of the framework in developing 
models and approach strategies. This theory considers the rationale in line with the nature of 
the business and the specific risks posed to the stakeholders so that admissible models and 
approaches can be established. By doing so, decision-makers and business investors are able 
to identify risks which are specific to the industry and social context, making high impact, low 
probability events foreseeable and approachable (2010:496). With regards to the extreme 
impact that is characteristic of a Black Swan, observer dependence of the event follows from 
the fact that there are no absolute, observer independent standards which counts as extreme 
impact. This too is something that will depend on positions, interests and evaluative attitudes 
of decision-makers which will inform their understanding of ‘extreme impact’ and thus their 
methods of approach.  
Similarly, Lindaas & Pettersen (2016:1233) put forward methods of ‘de-blackening’ the Black 
Swan by considering the characteristic of its outlier status. They too mention that these events 
are inherently perspectivistic in that their existence and associated uncertainties are dependent 
on the eyes of the beholder. Therefore it is not an objectively defined phenomenon but rather 
it was not expected by the particular observer. Additionally, Taleb considers the 
unexpectedness of a Black Swan event to be a lack of knowledge however, if the event itself 
is to be considered a surprise this is an indication of the presence of an expectation and therefore 
cannot be claimed as an outlier (2007:xix). This again speaks of the academic paradox and 
conceptual dilemma of what constitutes a Black Swan. This can be negated by firstly noting 
that the ‘surprising’ aspect must be understood in relation to whom and when (Aven, 2015:84). 
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Secondly, Lindaas and Pettersen state that by the sharing of knowledge and beliefs through 
effective channels of communication, the element of surprise can be significantly reduced. 
Once this has been removed, the event cannot be considered a Black Swan.  
Furthermore, knowledge about what is considered as an unknown known can be turned into 
known knowns. In this regard, risk analysts and decision-makers assess the knowledge they 
have about the risk factors and variables and how this may result in a high impact, low 
probability event and thus plan accordingly. There is an emphasis made on the dissemination 
of knowledge whereby one is simply informed of what lies ahead (Zizek, 2008:457). However, 
if there is no existing knowledge that an attack, for example may occur, this can similarly be 
approached through relevant cognitive processes, imaginative prediction and other collective 
practices. This is a certain strategy in accessing tacit knowledge, thereby identifying triggers 
which constitutes an approach to the event (Lindaas & Pettersen, 2016:1236).  
Imaginative prediction is not a closed process and is ongoing. This continuity provides the 
preoccupation with the elicitation of ideas based on the acknowledgement that surprises are 
possible (Pettersen, 2013:110). The continuity allows risk analysts to identify possible triggers 
and how these may develop over time. Additionally, they mention that forecasting includes the 
search for weak signals, organisational shortcomings and better ways to describe threats and 
dangers. By doing so, risk assessment and management processes remain relevant and robust. 
Secondly, the authors mention that PRA needs to possess process connectivity in order to 
identify risks successfully (Gross, 2010:40). The more people and expertise are involved in 
imaginative thinking, the more accurate the forecasts become. Therefore, diverse approaches, 
mind sets and experiences need to be interconnected in the analysis of risk (Lindaas & 
Pettersen, 2016:1241-1242). By implementing these steps in PRA does not prevent surprising 
events from happening but improves preparedness. However, even if an unforeseen event takes 
place, the authors mention that due to the nature of these steps the consequences of such will 
still be easier to manage.  
By acknowledging how a conceptual framework affects the understanding of risk, risk 
management shapes how risk analysts and decision-makers are able to approach potential 
events. The conceptualisation of risks therefore has a direct influence on how models and 
approaches are compiled in PRA. Furthermore, by considering process connectivity and 
continuity alongside the relevance of information used allows models to be more adaptable and 
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robust against extreme risks and uncertainties. The practicality of this will be shown in the 
following section.  
3.4.4. Assumption Analysis and other Proactive Approaches   
Baxter (2016) claims that traditional PRA relies on the identification of risks based on the 
experience of risk analysts and stakeholders in the enterprise, suggesting that if the risk is 
outside this realm of experience and expertise, it more than likely will not be considered. This 
is considered to be a primary reason as to why Black Swan events cannot be managed or 
approached. He also mentions that even brainstorming techniques will be an unlikely method 
in capturing Black Swans in that they will result in either too narrow or too broad assumptions. 
However, through assumption analysis, risk factors and triggers are better identified. By 
recognising a number of assumptions (featuring both internal and external factors) which range 
from low, medium and high impact, risk management, business strategies and approaches can 
be developed. These assumptions should be considered separately from the already prevalent 
risks as often these high impact, low probability events are unrelated to what is already seen 
and determined. Assumption analysis includes measures of proactivity as the assumptions are 
actionable and thus reduces potential impact. Secondly it is reactive as contingency plans are 
developed, establishing ready approaches if a Black Swan event did materialise.    
Similarly to this, the Assumption Based Communication Dynamics (ABCD) is a formal 
methodology which enables the capturing of different knowledges and viewpoints from 
stakeholders by encouraging the communication of issues and assumptions. This is considered 
as a proactive management of risks. This approach places a great emphasis on communication 
and the improvement thereof so that risks can be increasingly avoided or managed proactively. 
Furthermore, the model focuses on assumptions rather than risks which allows decision-makers 
and stakeholders to feel and act more positively where there would normally be a discomfort 
surrounding potential risks and the assessment thereof. There are three key characteristics of 
the ABCD method, the first being increased communication. This provides a simple, common 
language on risk, making the potential of high impact, low probability events manageable and 
actionable. Secondly, the method gives control to decision-makers and stakeholders by 
providing a simple overview of the complexities involved in risks. This increased control 
facilitates as a decision making structure allowing for the approach towards these risks. Lastly, 
this method also provides flexibility which can be tailored to specific industries or 
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environments, ensuring that all significant risks to the projects are identified and controlled at 
the appropriate time (De-Risk, n.d.).   
The ABCD methodology is based on assumption analysis, which uses structures and techniques 
through various sources of information. Once this has been considered, assumptions which 
ranked (whereby A is extremely low risk and D is extremely high risk) as the most unstable 
are assumed to have the greatest risk. Because there is no ‘medium’ ranking, this provides more 
effective guidance on how to best approach the risk and its potential effects (De-Risk, n.d.).  
Another proactive measure in potentially approaching Black Swan events is through block-
chain technology. Coulson-Thomas (2012) mentions that in order for risk analysts to be better 
prepared for risk and their potential impacts, PRA needs to become increasingly innovative 
and explore alternative methods. He suggests block-chain technology to be one such way in 
which this can be done. Block-chain is a database in which experts from different fields and 
industries are able to input information. This information is then managed through a 
computerised program, whereby it is sorted and stored according to relevance. Digital trust in 
is ensured through authentication and authorisation keys so that only credible information is 
contributed to the system. Once this has been done, a master copy is then sent to clients or risk 
analysts and models and approaches are compiled from this. Because this information is always 
being updated by various experts from their respective industries, the models and approaches 
in use are benefiting. This offers a robustness to the models and methods in use, as stakeholders 
are able to make decisions with precision (Bauerle, n.d.).   
Le Merle (2011) mentions that because Black Swan events often have a ripple effect even if 
they initiate in a specific industry, large companies should consider a variety of factors in order 
to identify and mitigate potential business disruptions. He states that this is typically done 
through Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). ERM is a plan-based business strategy which 
aims to identify, assess, prepare for and approach any dangers, hazards and other potential 
disasters. This discipline calls for corporations to identify all the risks that they may face and 
then to decide which of these to manage effectively. However, Le Merle states that because 
this method primarily focuses on the day to day risks a company faces, it does not have the 
capacity to monitor potential high impact, low probability events on a continuous or regular 
basis.  
In addition to this, Le Merle claims that due to the specific nature, the instability of its variables 
and indicators as well as its quick manifestation, Black Swans should be considered alongside 
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disrupter analysis. Although the author mentions that neither ERM nor disrupter analysis can 
predict a Black Swan event, the latter aims to complement the former. This is designed to 
periodically administer stress tests to large companies in order to assess their ability to 
withstand potential Black Swan events. Disrupter analysis consists of a four-step process, 
shaping the enterprise, determining the depth of potential disruptions and considers ‘what-if’ 
questions to obtain the likelihood and severity of such events. Furthermore, Le Merle states 
that the key to creating a list of potential Black Swan events is to cast a wide net by cataloguing 
possible catastrophic events. This net should be wide enough so that it includes representatives 
of as many Black Swan categories as possible (political, social, economic, environmental and 
technological). Once this has been done, they should be categorised according to the severity 
of their impact and this synthesised, workable list therefore encapsulates the possible Black 
Swan events businesses could experience. Although the author maintains that one could never 
be prepared for every possible Black Swan, ERM alongside disrupter analysis can complement 
the day-to-day developments in risk, therefore incorporating antifragility into the models and 
approach strategies.      
Another proactive approach which can be used in PRA is through the consideration of Actors, 
Factors, Time and Location. With the continual analysis of these relevant indicators, risk 
analysts will be able to identify and approach potential high impact, low probability risks and 
their causal events. This novice approach can be used alongside developed models in PRA in 
order to ensure accuracy in forecasting as it considers developing trends which may impact 
business or governmental trajectories. This approach also considers the socio-political status 
of a country to be of high importance as this influences how it is able to and how effectively it 
can respond to devastation. As this approach is applied to existing models of approach in PRA, 
it allows risk analysts to identify high impact, low probability risks and approach them 
timeously. Below is a risk index for the approach which will be applied to examples of 
scenarios in the following chapter.  
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Table 2: A Novice Approach to High Impact, Low Probability Risk and Events – an 
Index:  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
By acknowledging the different strategies and methods risk analysts are able to utilise in 
identifying and approaching extreme risks, how Black Swans are constituted is often 
questioned. The way in which events of this nature are understood and approached are therefore 
needing clarification in order for PRA to remain credible, robust and necessary to investors. 
Through the analysis presented above, Taleb’s characteristics on what constitutes a Black Swan 
are heavily critiqued. This can be seen by the developed quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies. It must be noted that there are many other ways in which one can successfully 
approach risk however, it is impossible to consider an exhaustive list in a Master’s thesis. Those 
which have been presented are deemed most important by the author for the purposes of this 
study as she contemplates possible alternatives, critiques and oppositions to Taleb’s Black 
Swan theory.    
Quantitative methods, largely formed on the foundation of probability, have been a popular 
technique in identifying and approaching risks, with models being structured along similar 
lines. However, as a result of the fact that high impact, low probability events cannot be fully 
captured through numeracy, gaps are presented whereby Black Swan events find their niche. 
This is remedied through qualitative approaches which ranges from increased communication 
Risk Indicator  Description  
Actors  - Actors who should be considered based on socio-political trends.  
- Terrorist organisations. 
- Flight risk individuals.   
Factors  - Motivations, aims and objectives of the Actor. 
- Laws in a country which evoke violence (e.g. gun laws in America).  
- The involvement of countries in anti-terrorism coalitions.  
- Western enemies of terrorist organisations.   
Time  
(Opportunity) 
- The specific time around religious or national holidays provide favourable 
circumstances for unexpected events.  
- Music concerts/festivals.  
- Sporting events.                                                                            Opportunity.  
- Any gathering where there is a large number of people.  
Location  - Where is the risk analysis being done?  
- Location will determine the likelihood of events.  
- Location and socio-political status will determine resource availability and 
deployment.  
- Location will determine response mechanisms and impact of devastation.   
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strategies, diplomacy, conceptualisation and environmental shaping. Although both 
quantitative and qualitative methods claim that one is able to identify the triggers which may 
lead to Black Swan events, it cannot be firmly declared that surprising events do not happen. 
However, how Black Swan events are understood needs to be refined in order for PRA to be 
able to identify and approach related risks. Here it is important to understand that it is the 
perspective of how a Black Swan is conceptualised and observed which will ultimately 
determine how it can be approached. By considering these approaches towards high impact, 
low probability risks and related events, it is determined that the applicability of the Black 
Swan as a classification of events is misplaced. The next chapter will demonstrate this and 
show how risk analysts are able to consider and forecast high impact, low probability events 
by applying the abovementioned Novice Approach to three scenarios.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE RE-EVALUATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF BLACK 
SWANS IN POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS   
4.1. Introduction  
With the conceptual development shown in chapter two alongside the presented critiques and 
alternatives to approaching risk in chapter three, the way in which Black Swans are 
conceptualised and classified in PRA is enigmatic. In PRA, the Black Swan has been given a 
variety of names and is therefore interpreted and approached according to a specific 
understanding and perspective. Rice and Zegart (2018:5-6) mention in their findings that 21st 
century political risk is the probability that political action could impact business ventures 
significantly. They make specific use of the term ‘political’ action rather than ‘governmental’ 
action due to the growing role of different risk generators outside of the usual places such as 
capitals, army barracks and party headquarters. The nature of risk has changed to include a 
number of different factors. This suggests that with the utilisation of relevant knowledge and 
models, high impact, low probability risks and related events can be approached. The authors 
mention that a Blackfish Effect18 is comprised of relatively new forms of potential risks that 
could critically derail a company and organisation. These risks are formed through 
conversations in homes, universities, the boardrooms of companies and on neighbourhood 
streets. All of these ‘new’ risks have an increase on the impact of risk and have been considered 
as one of the leading factors of cyber threats and terrorism. It is therefore determined that risk 
is dynamic and constantly changing. These changing risks should be acknowledged in PRA so 
that risk analysts are able to identify and approach them accordingly.      
This chapter will discuss the applicability of the Black Swan in PRA. By undoing Taleb’s Black 
Swan theory and its three primary characteristics, these kinds of risks and their impacts become 
more digestible through PRA. By this, events which were once considered impossible to 
forecast and approach become attainable and malleable. By reconsidering how high impact, 
low probability events can approached, the way in which this is done is dependent on the 
                                                          
18 Rice and Zegart (2018:3-4) consider high impact, low probability events as the Blackfish Effect as a result of 
the large scale stock price plummet of 60 per cent at SeaWorld Entertainment Inc. This was a direct impact of 
the release of a movie titled Blackfish (2013) which exposed the treatment of its highlighted animal, the Orca 
and how this not only harmed them but their trainers too. Consequentially, many corporations such as Hyundai, 
Virgin-America Airline and Southwest Airline - cut their sponsorship and attendance to the park drastically 
declined. With the awareness brought by the small scale production SeaWorld, its entertainment stock 
plummeted from $38.92 in July 2013 to $15.77 million in December 2014. The stock had still not recovered by 
2017. Thus the cascading impact of the film has been dubbed the Blackfish Effect.     
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observer of these risks and therefore determines their subsequent impacts. The perspective from 
which the particular risk is approached is conditional on factors which may be more relevant 
to one organisation or country than another. What might be considered as high impact and low 
probability to some, may not be to others. Therefore, there are certain criteria which can be 
used in order to approach these risks. This chapter will demonstrate how the application of four 
primary indices, Actors, Factors, Time and Location - may help identify these kinds of risks. 
Once these high impact, low probability risks are recognised, this will aid risk analysts to 
develop the necessary approach strategies. However, it should be noted that a state’s ability to 
respond to crises and utilise approach strategies is dependent on their resource capacity and 
availability.  
This chapter will show that by acknowledging relevant indicators through the Novice Approach 
mentioned in chapter three that they can be classified as high impact, low probability events in 
PRA. With the other approaches mentioned in chapter three alongside this suggested 
perspective, it indicates how high impact, low probability risks can be forecasted and therefore 
their impacts minimised. By doing so, Taleb’s Black Swan as a classification of events can be 
removed from PRA.     
4.2. Recapitulation of the Black Swan in Political Risk Analysis  
This study so far has considered the conceptual developments which have taken place in PRA 
and how this has shaped risk analysts’ approach to risk. PRA has expanded to include country 
risk, transfer risk and regional risk so that the relevant factors and indicators can be identified 
and analysed. In addition to this, when considering political uncertainty and instability in the 
conceptualisation and opperationalisation of PRA, this has further enabled risk analysts to 
understand and approach the relevant risks and corresponding factors. This has made PRA 
increasingly robust in its opperationalisation and therefore has improved the accuracy of its 
analysis.  
Furthermore, Taleb’s Black Swan theory has provided the opportunity for conceptual and 
operational expansion in PRA. Risks associated with Black Swans, which Taleb has claimed 
as impossible to identify and plan for, have propelled risks analysts to consider a variety of 
approaches. Black Swans have previously been cryptic to understand and therefore difficult to 
approach, thus resulting in the impacts of such risks being devastating to business and societies 
and therefore significantly influencing its trajectories. Furthermore, as a result of the many 
different names given to the Black Swan, this has contributed to its complexity. Examples of 
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these other names are Wild Cards19, Fat Tails20, The Black Fish Effect21 and Perfect Storms22. 
These different perspectives on how high impact, low probability risks can be approached 
became problematic for risk analysts as they lacked agreed upon clarity and understanding. 
Although each of these concepts has differences in comparison to Taleb’s Black Swan, they all 
have fundamental characteristics in common, i.e. being that these low feasibility risks develop 
into events which have catastrophic impacts, amplified by failed approach strategies. However, 
because there are commonalities in these various understandings of the Black Swan, this has 
allowed for the creation of competent approaches to these risks and their potential events.    
The challenges surrounding the understanding of Black Swans has prompted alternative ways 
to develop approach strategies so that these risks become manageable. As it was presented in 
chapter three, these approach strategies are based on either quantitative or qualitative methods. 
The techniques range from methods of probability and statistical approaches to environmental 
shaping, the development and application of relevant knowledge and scenario building. These 
methods have been established as a general opposition to Taleb’s Black Swan, as they are 
presented as alternatives with which to approach risk. By doing so, the way in which high 
impact, low probability risks are identified, analysed and therefore approached has further 
advanced PRA.  
One such method of approach towards high impact, low probability risks is scenario building. 
Professor of International Relations at Stellenbosch University discusses his experience with 
this strategy saying that if analysts are theoretically able to develop a scenario which has a built 
in ‘wild card’ element into its structure, its ‘wild card’ status is thus questioned. Once these 
risks and scenarios are identified, it should then be considered and analysed as the other, more 
‘regular’ risks. This he contemplates as an academic paradox to which Taleb’s Black Swan 
theory can be likened. With the various approach strategies showing how risk analysts have 
been able to approach high impact, low probability risks, it brings into question the validity of 
the unforseeability of a Black Swan. Once risks of this nature are identified and developed into 
approach strategies, it can no longer be called a ‘wild card’ or a Black Swan. Furthermore, they 
state that approach methodologies such as scenario building and the like need to be robust 
enough to identify and prepare for high impact, low probability risks. He mentions that if this 
                                                          
19 Interview with Professor of International Relations at the University of Stellenbosch, July 2018.  
20 Bremmer & Keat, 2009:2.  
21 Rice & Zegart, 2018:3-4.  
22 Cornell, 2012: 1824.  
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is not done, the job of scenario building in particular is not done effectively (Interview with 
International Relations professor, July 2018).  
In agreement with this, the business professor interviewed mentions Taleb’s academic 
dishonesty in his development of the Black Swan theory. He particularly considers Taleb’s 
‘anti-fragility’ thesis in saying that this is contradictory to his Black Swan theory.  By 
incorporating methods of antifragility into organisational and bureaucratic structures, if high 
impact, low probability risks and events take place, they are still able to financially and 
politically operate, compete and benefit. This is in direct contrast with his idea of the Black 
Swan (Interview with Business Statistics Professor, July 2018). The way in which Taleb 
describes his Black Swan is done in such a way that its impacts will be felt across country 
borders and regardless of industry.  
Furthermore, the interviewee mentions that Taleb uses particular examples which support his 
theory of the Black Swan, rather than considering a wide range of cases which may challenge 
his claims. An example of this can be seen by the failed attempts to forecast and approach of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a classic Black Swan according to Taleb. Taleb puts forward that if 
this event could have been identified beforehand, it would have not taken place. However, the 
business professor from Stellenbosch Business School mentions a variety of terrorist and war-
related aeroplane crashes and attacks dating pre-World War II. Examples of these include: on 
14 June 1940, Soviet bombers shot down a Finnish commercial plane travelling from Estonia 
to Finland, killing nine people on board. One such passenger was an American diplomat, who 
was carrying sensitive diplomatic pouches from the United States of America Legislations in 
Estonia to Latvia. Another example is the plane crash which took place on 8 September 1974 
from Tel Aviv, via Athens, Greece. 88 passengers were killed on this flight after an explosion 
caused the plane to crash. The suspects of this attack were terrorists linked to the Abu Nidal 
group. A third example is the flight traveling to Paris on 19 September 1989 brought down by 
a bomb in the suitcase over the Sahara desert. Six people were found guilty in absentia and 
were sentenced to life imprisonment (Terrorism and War-Related Airplane Crashes Fast Facts, 
2018).   
 By acknowledging the various events which took place prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, one 
is able to identify similarities allowing adequate preparation time to implement approach 
strategies. In saying this, Taleb’s example of the 9/11 terrorist attacks being a Black Swan 
cannot be labelled as such as previous events, along with the similarity presented by its trends, 
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would have pointed to its occurrence. With this is mind, it is here where the business professor 
respondents claim regarding Taleb’s academic dishonesty can be seen (Interview with Business 
Statistics Professor, July 2018) 
The conceptual developments which have taken place, alongside the identified approaches to 
these risks and related events, using the Black Swan term in PRA as an explanation of failed 
identification and approach must be questioned. However, the reader should take note that this 
thesis does not argue that surprising events do not take place, but that rather these high impact, 
low probability events can be effectively mitigated through a relevant approach.  
PRA is designed to learn from trends and events and incorporate this knowledge into methods 
of approach. This is how PRA is constantly refined in the aims of a robust and relevant analysis. 
This can be done by identifying and analysing risks and corresponding events through certain 
approaches or angles.  The next section will apply the Novice Approach which was shown in 
chapter three. This approach can be used alongside already developed strategies and should be 
applied and continuously monitored from when the risk report is required. This approach will 
be applied to three examples and will show how high impact, low probability events can be 
forecast with the consideration of relevant indices. This approach makes a specific mention of 
the importance of the location being analysed. The examples chosen will show how its location 
lends itself to resource capacity and availability, and socio-political status, and how this 
influences the probability and impact of such events.  
4.3. A Novice Approach to High Impact, Low Probability Risks  
By analysing high impact, low probability events, it can be said that they have largely been 
theorised from a Western liberal perspective. The Black Swan theory considers high impact, 
low probability risks and related events which have taken place in the Global North. Examples 
these events have taken place in America23, Norway24, France25 and the United Kingdom26. 
These countries are of the presumption that the occurrence of high impact, low probability risk 
and related events is highly unlikely to take place on their home soil. Reasons for this include 
that these countries are characterised by general high levels of democracy and have relatively 
                                                          
23 Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. 
24 Andres Breivik lone wolf terrorist attacks in July 2011. 
25 A series of coordinated terrorist attacks took place in Paris on the 13 November 2015. This was shortly 
followed by a mass shooting and a series of suicide bombings outside restaurants. More than 130 people were 
killed and hundreds were wounded (Laffin, 2015).    
26 A terrorist attack which took place at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester on the 22 May 2017 where 23 
people were killed (Palazzo & Allen, 2017).   
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high levels of tolerance. They additionally value and protect human rights and have comparably 
low levels of crime. The combination of these contributes to a perceived political, social and 
economic stability partnered with high levels of safety and security which therefore establishes 
a perceived protection against such risks and events.   
However, there has been a general increase in lone-wolf terrorist attacks as well as attacks 
claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in these countries. The regularity of 
these events has established a pattern which can be identified and analysed in PRA, suggesting 
that they should be classified as high impact, low probability events. Despite this, these 
countries have neglected the understanding of the causes and nature of these events and 
therefore have created a self-imposed ‘blind spot’ in their risk analysis. As a result of this, these 
countries are not successful in identifying and approaching high impact, low probability risks 
and related events and therefore still experience and consider these as Black Swans.  
These new developments taking place in the Global North should be acknowledged so that 
these risks can be affectively approached. The Novice Approach provides risk analysts with 
relevant, general risk indicators which can be assessed in order for events to be forecasted. As 
seen in table 2, the Novice Approach comprises of Actors, Factors, Time (opportunity) and 
Location. The Actor is determined by the organisation, individual or any other perpetrator who 
is identified as a potential flight risk. The important Factors which are to be analysed are those 
which encourage the Actors to perform in such a way that incites violence. This could be 
determined by the involvement of a country or organisation who plays a strategic role in 
resisting harmful, destructive and illegal behaviour of the Actor. Alternatively, this can also be 
demonstrated by the gun laws of a country, safety and security procedures or the beliefs, aims 
and objectives of an individual.  
The Time of a potential high impact, low probability risk to develop into an event is important 
to acknowledge. Religious holidays such as Christmas, Eid or Yom Kippur creates an 
environment for a surprising event to take place. Risk analysts as well as those celebrating may 
overlook the possibility of certain risks around this time, thus increasing its impact and 
probability. Additionally, the timing of such can also be related to a specific opportunity for 
the event to occur. Prime opportunities are music festivals, concerts or sporting events. This is 
due to the substantial number of people these occasions may yield. Lastly, the Location should 
be a primary point of analysis. Countries such as Jordan are more likely to experience high 
impact, low probability risks and related events in comparison to that of America. This is 
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determined by analysing the current state of affairs of the host country. Because Jordan 
neighbours Syria and Iraq, there is an increased probability of military intervention and terrorist 
activity. Furthermore, countries such as America have a greater state capacity and resource 
availability to mitigate the impacts and devastation of these risks than those that have lower 
GDP levels and political and economic stability.  
Resource capacity and availability are integral in minimising the impact and devastation of 
high impact, low probability events, says a researcher from the Research Alliance for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (RADAR) at Stellenbosch University. She mentions that although these events 
occur with a significant element of surprise, its devastation is directly dependent on where this 
event has taken place. A country with a higher GDP such as America is able to drastically 
minimise the impact of destruction in comparison to a third world country. The more resources 
available alongside the ability to deploy them effectively, has a significant influence on the 
period of recovery a country experiences after these events have taken place. In this, she 
considers how these risks and related events cannot be classified as Black Swans as the impact 
is dependent on its Location and the resource availability (Interview with researcher from 
RADAR, 2018).   
The interviewee continues to say that it is the socio-political status of the specific location 
which will either exacerbate or mitigate the devastation. The same event which takes place in 
two different locations can be experienced differently. The example she gives is the 7.0 
magnitude earthquake which took place in Haiti in 2010. Here, she considers that if this 
earthquake was to occur in New Zealand (a country known for regular earthquakes and of a 
greater magnitude) it would not be as devastating. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
country has a wealth of resources available in managing high impact earthquakes due to their 
regularity. However, because it took place in a country ill prepared to manage this earthquake, 
alongside the poor socio-political status of the country, the devastation is increasingly 
entrenched and the period of recovery was extended. The initial impact of the earthquake 
transformed into another high impact, low probability event when the earthquake compromised 
the country’s main sewage system and water supply. This resulted in a cholera outbreak, 
rendering further deaths and causalities. Therefore, one is able to see how the socio-political 
status, Location and resource availability of a country are determining factors on the impact of 
such events (Interview with researcher from RADAR, 2018).   
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With the understanding of the Novice Approach in mind as well as acknowledging how 
Location and resource availability affect high impact, low probability risks and related events, 
it will now be applied to three different events that have taken place at a music festival or 
concert. These examples were chosen to show the contrast between the Location and the Actors 
involved as well as how the Novice Approach can be applied regardless of this. By applying 
this approach to these examples, this will show how these examples should be classified as 
high impact, low probability events.   
4.3.1. Terrorist Attack, Jordan: Fuheis Music Festival, August 2018  
On 10 August 2018, an attack was executed near the town of Fuheis, north-west of Amman, 
the capital of Jordan. This city is a self-declared Christian city in a predominantly Muslim 
country, which borders Israel, Syria and Saudi Arabia. These countries have been characterised 
by civil wars, persistent conflict and the presence of increased terrorist activity claimed by 
ISIL. In identifying and analysing the political and social instability of the surrounding 
locations, the probability for high impact risks and related events therefore increases. The 
prominence of ISIL in this region, alongside its aims and objectives need to be considered in 
order for the approach to be applied and to remain effective in the risk analysis.   
ISIL is an extremist group which is founded upon the Sunni Islamic religion. ISIL has 
established control over large sections of land stretching from central Iraq to northern Syria. 
The main objective of the group is the restoration and advancement of the caliphate27 of early 
Islam, which includes its related political, religious and eschatological aims. Here there is a 
rejection of secular and progressive laws and lifestyles which are not founded on Sunni Law. 
Any person or state which does not prescribe to this ideal is thus considered to be an enemy of 
ISIL and of Islam. Therefore, it is determined that countries situated in the Global North that 
are predominantly governed by democracy are primary oppositions of ISIL. The group has 
been known to spread its caliphate through scare tactics such as the publication of beheadings 
onto social media platforms. ISIL has also claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist 
attacks and suicide bombings in Western countries such as the Paris attacks in 2015 (Lister, 
2015).            
                                                          
27 The caliphate can be understood to be a state under the rule of an Islamic leader known as the ‘Caliph’ who 
is considered as a successor to the Prophet Mohammed. The caliphate of ISIL was first established in Syria, where 
the organisation controls large portions of land and oil fields. Although this has since been eradicated as a result 
of the declared War on Terrorism, ISIL continues its guerrilla warfare (Cocker, Schmitt & Callimachi, 2017).  
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A home-made bomb was placed under a police car on duty at the Fuheis Music Festival, which 
was then detonated. As a result, a shootout between the perpetrators and the police ensued at a 
building where the suspects were hiding. Several bombs exploded during this raid, resulting in 
the collapse of the building and the death of four security members, three suspects and injuring 
a further 20 civilians. ISIL has since claimed responsibility for the attack, naming them the 
primary Actors. Because of the Location of the attack, there is naturally a higher risk and 
probability for these events. This is due to the profile of its neighbours, as well as the fact that 
it is a Christian city and the country borders Syria, the motherland of ISIL. However, Jordan 
has statistically not experienced as much terrorist and military activity in comparison as the 
last terrorist attack in the country was recorded in 2016. This suggests that for this specific 
Location, the probability of regular terrorist attacks in the area is moderate (Hamed, 2018).     
The Fuheis Music Festival provided ISIL with a prime opportunity to execute an attack. The 
festival is held annually in Jordan and is the second biggest music festival hosted by the 
country. It welcomes bands and artists from Jordan, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon to perform 
music and participate in poetry evenings. This event is not a religious celebration as artists have 
incorporated Western compositions into their performances. This event is highly anticipated 
event by the Jordanian people and yields a crowd of 10 000 and 20 000. Due to the number of 
people the festival brings, police and other security personnel were employed to check concert-
goers upon entry. These check-points were positioned at a safe radius around the concert area, 
making sure that no weapons and other harmful possessions were brought into the grounds. By 
identifying this, it can be determined that police and security personnel had identified the 
potential for a high impact, low probability event. This was done by considering the nature and 
size of the concert alongside the aims and objectives of ISIL. Although an attack still took 
place, this was done on the outskirts of the established check-points which significantly 
minimised casualties (Embury-Dennis, 2018). Some of the primary Factors to analyse allowing 
risk analysts to forecast this event taking place is that Jordan has played an active role in an 
international military coalition which has helped push back ISIL. This operation has focused 
on neighbouring Syria and Iraq, which is considered the homeland of ISIL. Furthermore, the 
country’s predominantly Christian demographic should also be identified as a Factor to 
encourage attacks of this nature. As the country does not prescribe to the Islamic religion, it is 
considered as an enemy of ISIL and therefore becomes a targeted Location.  
By analysing the relevant Actors, Factors, Time (or opportunity) and Location of the event, 
this allowed security personnel to act cautiously and timeously. Security forces were deployed 
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to the music festival as the Actors and Factors were identified and analysed. In doing so, the 
potential for an attack to take place was acknowledged and approached effectively. Although 
there were still causalities as a result of the explosion, the number of these was significantly 
minimised. This shows that when the relevant risk indicators are identified and continuously 
analysed, an event of this nature can be approached. The approach shows that regardless of the 
fact that the attack was conducted by ISIL in a Middle Eastern country, that it can still be 
successfully approached and mitigated. By this, it is classified as high impact, low probability 
event.  
Table 3: The Novice Approach – Jordan, Fuheis Music Festival  
 
4.3.2. Terrorist Attack, Manchester: Ariana Grande Concert, May 2017  
On 22 May 2018 a suicide bombing took place at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, 
United Kingdom. ISIL has since declared that it was a member of their organisation, Salman 
Abedi, who detonated a homemade bomb as concert goers were leaving the venue. Although 
Abedi acted alone in the event, ISIL is still considered as the primary Actor. The explosion 
resulted in the deaths of 23 people and injuring a further 300 out of the 15 000 large crowed. 
When applying the Novice Approach to a risk analysis, the concert is identified as a prime 
opportunity for an attack to take place. Considering the vast number of people who attended 
this concert, this provided a niche opportunity for ISIL to execute an event of mass devastation, 
panic and bloodshed. Although this is the largest documented terrorist attack to take place in 
Britain since the London bombings in 200528, there have been a number of similar events which 
                                                          
28 On 7 July 2005, a series of coordinated suicide bombings were detonated, targeting commuters using the 
public transportation system during the morning rush hour. Three bombs exploded in quick succession whilst 
Indicator Description 
Actors  - Terrorist organisation, ISIL.  
Factors  - Fuheis is a Christian city.  
- The music festival is considered a ‘Western celebration’  
- Jordan has played an active role in international military coalitions resisting 
ISIL.  
Time  
(Opportunity)  
- The music festival provided a prime opportunity for an attack.  
- Large gathering of people.  
Location  - Jordan borders Syria and Iraq (home territory of ISIL).  
- Area characterised with civil wars, terrorism and military intervention.  
- Resource capacity made available by identifying possible risks, minimising 
impact and devastation.  
Overview  By analysing these risk indicators, this is classified as a high impact, low 
probability event.  
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have taken place in Britain and Western Europe. Some of these include the suicide bombings 
in Brussels in 201629 and the attack outside Westminster Palace in 201730. Furthermore, the 
possibility of a terrorist attack in the United Kingdom has steadily increased since August of 
2014. The analysis of these familiar trends has shown that its status has veered between 
substantial (an attack is a strong possibility) and severe, being that an attack is highly likely. 
This status has not dipped below ‘substantial’ since 2008 (Palazzo & Allen, 2017).  
By acknowledging and analysing the increase in these trends and features of terrorist and lone-
wolf activity, events such as these are classified as high in impact and low in probability in 
PRA. As the likelihood of these events has increased in the West, this suggests that they are 
able to be forecasted through a continuous risk analysis. Because of the Location of this event 
alongside the Western liberal theories and mechanisms applied in their analysis, these countries 
believe that they have an extremely low probability of occurrence.  Therefore, one is able to 
see how this ‘blind spot’ disrupts PRA and its related approaches in identifying risks and 
forecasting events. However, by analysing the increasing trends in terrorist activity with the 
Novice Approach, this can be successfully accomplished. Thus the Global North still 
experiences the largescale impacts and devastation of these events, despite their regularity and 
the resources available to forecast them. This is a result of the mismanagement of the resources 
available to mitigate the effects of these events. Even though Britain has counter-terrorism 
mechanisms in place, their ability to limit and approach opportunities of sophisticated terrorist 
attacks remains misplaced.   
An example of the poor resource deployment and strategic security oversights surrounding the 
Manchester concert, can be seen by the fact that the explosion took place after the concert. This 
shows that Abedi was able to walk into the premises with a weapon of mass destruction without 
thorough security checks prohibiting him. Additionally, poor communication between police 
and fire forces resulted in their arrival at the scene hours after the explosion, prolonging 
                                                          
the ISIL bombers were aboard the London Underground Trains. As a result, 52 people were killed and a further 
700 were severely injured. On 21 July 2005, four further attempted bombings were planned on the same 
transportation system however, a fault in these bombs prevented their explosion (Cowell, 2015).   
29 On 22 March 2016 two coordinated suicide bombings were executed in Brussels. One of these at the airport 
and the other at a metro rail station. These attacks were conducted by the same cell of terrorists (belonging to 
ISIL) who were linked to the Paris attacks in 2015. 35 people were killed in these bombings and a further 300 
were injured (Bloch, 2016).   
30 On 22 March 2017 a terrorist attack took place outside the Palace of Westminster in London. This ISIL related 
terrorist attack injured 50 people and killing five after a car was driven into a group of civilians. This was done 
after the ISIL made a specific plea to their member to target countries who were specifically acting in resistance 
towards them (Bennhold & Castle, 2017).   
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assistance to victims. Had there been sufficient checks in place, the explosion and the 
devastation surrounding it could have been avoided.  
Furthermore, British Intelligence Agency MI5 was warned by their American counterpart in 
January of 2018 that Abedi was planning an attack on British soil. Abedi was placed on the 
American terrorist watch list after an investigation was conducted into terrorist groups 
operating in Libya. Although Abedi was on the MI5 radar, investigations surrounding his 
activity dwindled, allowing for his attack to be planned and executed unnoticed (Kentish, 
2017). It can therefore be seen how countries in the Global North have the necessary resources 
to identify and approach these high impact, low probability risks and forecast their events, 
however the intelligence to do so is not effectively managed. Because these risks and events 
are not classified as daily risks, their analysis is not continuous, meaning they are not forecasted 
timeously and adequately mitigated.  
Other primary Factors which should be considered is that Britain plays a leading role in the 
Global Coalition. This is a unified body comprising of 74 countries which aims to defeat ISIL 
through any military means possible. The Coalition resists ISIL operations by tackling its 
finances and preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters into countries (Williamson, 2018). 
Furthermore, as Britain does not prescribe to the ideologies of ISIL and their aims of a 
worldwide caliphate, the country is considered to be an enemy of the organisation. This in 
combination with the military tactics against ISIL provides the reason why ISIL chooses 
countries such as Britain in the Global North to execute attacks. With the analysis of these 
relevant indicators as well as by acknowledging the resource capacity and availability of the 
country, the attack in Manchester is classified as a high impact, low probability event. The next 
example will serve as a contrast between the two previous examples. This will be done by 
considering Actors other than ISIL. It will therefore show how the approach can be applied to 
examples unrelated to terrorist organisations.  
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Table 4: The Novice Approach – Manchester, Ariana Grande Concert 
 
4.3.3. Lone-wolf Attack, Las Vegas: Route 91 Music Festival, October 2017   
On the 1 October 2017 a gunman, Stephan Paddock fired approximately 1100 rounds from his 
Mandalay Hotel suite on the 32nd floor killing 58 people and injuring a further 851, in Nevada 
Las Vegas. Paddock targeted a crowd of 22 000 who were attending the Route 91 Music 
Festival. As can be seen by the previous examples, the concert and the large crowd it attracted 
gave opportunity for an event of this nature to take place. This incident has since been 
considered as the deadliest mass shooting committed by an individual in the United States of 
America (USA), subsequently reigniting the debate around the countries gun laws. The 
investigations conducted on this event have concluded that Paddock had no specific motive. 
Paddock was found dead in his hotel room shortly after the shooting with a self-inflicted 
gunshot wound to the head (Boyle & Henderson, 2017).  
By analysing the event with the Novice Approach, the primary Actor, Stephan Paddock, said 
not to be affiliated to any terrorist organisation is considered as a lone-wolf terrorist. This 
shows that these high impact, low probability events occur not only as a result of organisational 
terrorist activity and that there are a variety of other Factors which serve as indicators to be 
analysed in forecasting. Furthermore, the USA (as the primary Location of the risk analysis) is 
of importance when analysing the relevant risk factors pertaining to this case. The 9/11 terrorist 
attacks of 2001 brought about the development of new-age terrorism resulting in the 
establishment of the Global War on Terror. This was issued as a military intervention strategy 
in combating terrorist activity in the USA. As a result, the Department of Homeland Security 
was established to monitor suspicious activity, investigate terrorist groups and prevent terrorist 
Indicator Description 
Actors  - Salman Abedi.  
- Member of ISIL.   
Factors  - Britain is a leading member of the anti-terrorism Global Coalition.  
- Western country, democratic values, does not prescribe to ISIL’s caliphate.  
- Intelligence and security oversights of MI5 and security personnel at concert.  
Time  
(Opportunity)  
- Ariana Grande Concert.  
- Large gathering of people.  
Location  - Britain, Western liberal democracy.  
- Known enemy of ISIL.  
- Abundant resource availability, yet not utilised effectively to mitigate event.  
Overview  By analysing the abovementioned indicators, this event is classified as a high in 
impact and low in probability.  
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attacks from occurring. However, although high impact, low probability terrorist related risks 
and events has declined in the country since 9/11, the way in which terrorism has been 
understood and approached have subsequently created a ‘blind spot’ in the countries risk 
analysis. This lends itself to prominent Factors which should be considered for this and other 
potential events.  
Some of the integral Factors of the analysis is that, although there has been a decline in 
international terrorism in the country, there has been a steady increase in domestic attacks and 
violence. These are considered as ‘lone-wolf attacks’ or ‘shootings’, rather than acts of 
terrorism and therefore are approached as such. According to the Gun Violence Archive, the 
general understanding for a ‘mass shooting’ is when four or more individuals are shot in the 
same location.  A ‘mass killing’ is defined by when more than three people are killed in a 
shootings. The Patriot Act of 2001 defines ‘terrorism’ to be intended activities which are 
dangerous to human life and are in violation of the criminal laws of the country, affecting the 
conduct of the government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping (The United States 
of America, 2001). Acts of terrorism are considered to be planned and executed by an ‘enemy’ 
of the state and are often not considered to be a citizen of the country.  
With these conceptualisations used as a point of analysis of the type of event alongside the 
nature of the Las Vegas shooting, it brings into question why the attack is not considered as an 
act of terrorism. Conceptual differences and misunderstandings such as these result in 
important indicators and factors being overlooked, resulting in the inability to forecast. This 
can be considered as the ‘blind spot’ whereby most high impact, low probability risks develop 
into events and because they are not identified and adequately approached. However, by 
applying the Novice Approach the three examples can be contrasted with one another. 
Although the Actors of the previous examples were terrorist organisations, the impact or 
probability of an event is not determined by this. The shooting at the Route 91 Music Festival, 
executed by a lone-wolf terrorist, could have still been forecasted with the Novice Approach 
had the relevant factors been considered. It is important to acknowledge that neither terrorist 
related attacks nor lone-wolf attacks are irrevocably inconvincible and unapproachable.   
A primary Factor to be considered in this example are the gun laws of the country. Paddock 
was permitted to purchase 47 firearms easily and illegally. America is notoriously known for 
its relaxed gun laws, with little to no purchasing restrictions in place. Although these laws differ 
between states, Nevada is particularly notorious for granting easy access to weapons. The 
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general procedure to purchase a gun in the USA requires that the purchase be cleared through 
databased checks established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These checks 
include the due diligence of place of purchase, number of already purchased/owned guns and 
mental stability checks. Through these checks, Paddock was not considered a flight risk, 
allowing him to purchase and own multiple guns within his legal rights. The law states that a 
person may not purchase multiple (more than two) within five days of each other however, this 
still gave Paddock sufficient time to build his cache of arsenal. Additionally, Paddock bought 
a majority of the ammunition and other items used in the attack through private sellers off the 
internet, meaning that no formal background checks and balances took place regarding the 
eligibility of his purchase. Paddock then modified these weapons to operate as assault rifles, 
whereby hundreds of rounds were shot per minute, resulting in the mass devastation and death 
(France-Presse, 2017).   
Investigations have since revealed that Paddock was being treated for mental illness conditions, 
which should have otherwise been cause for caution when granting access to purchase the 
firearms. Therefore, the creditworthiness of the established checks are questioned (France-
Presse, 2017). Other Factors to consider are the lack of security checks at the Mandalay Hotel.  
Paddock was able to bring in a large number of weapons and ammunition into his suite without 
established security precautions stopping him. Although obtaining the vast amount of weapons 
had been done so without prohibition, the attack itself would have been deferred had the hotel 
employed sufficient security checks upon entering and exiting the hotel.    
As the USA gun laws grant permission for citizens to have easy access to weapons, the checks 
and balances in place regarding the eligibility of purchases should be significantly robust. 
However, even though the reality of an attack of this nature is uncommon, the probability still 
exists and therefore it is classified as a high impact, low probability event. The relaxed gun 
laws of the country and the ineffective security inspections, gun related risks and related high 
impact, low probability events become inevitable. Furthermore, there have been several lone-
wolf attacks in the USA where the weapon used has been a legally obtained gun31.The gun 
laws of America are a causal Factor for the number of increasing lone-wolf terrorist attacks 
                                                          
31 There have been a total of 246 mass shootings this year in the USA as of 6 September 2018. In 2017 there 
were 346. Many of these shootings have taken place on school premises. Children as old as 15 have been named 
the primary Actors of mass shootings in schools. A recent school shooting in Santa Fe, Texas took place on 18 
May 2018, marking it as the 22nd school shooting for the year. A 17 year old student opened fire on the school 
grounds killing ten and injuring a further 13. This shooting sparked a national and global outrage calling for the 
National Rifle Association (NRA) to establish stricter gun laws, prohibiting events such as these from occurring 
(Calfas, 2018).     
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which take place in the country. This has resulted in the rise of domestic violence which should 
be a primary point of analysis when conducting a risk analysis in the country.    
Table 5:  The Novice Approach – Las Vegas, Route 91 Music Festival  
Indicator Description 
Actors  - Stephan Paddock.   
- Lone-wolf terrorist.  
Factors  - Relaxed gun laws increase domestic violence.  
- Inefficient security checks in purchasing guns.  
- Ability to freely purchase guns off the internet.  
- Poor security checks at hotel.  
Time  
(Opportunity)  
- Route 91 Music Festival  
- Large gathering of people.  
Location  - America.  
- Resource available, yet not utilised effectively to forecast event.  
Overview  By analysing the abovementioned indicators, this event is classified as a high in 
impact and low in probability.  
 
4.4. The Novice Approach in Political Risk Analysis: A Summary  
By analysing these examples with the Novice Approach, it shows that the Location of these 
high impact, low probability risks and related events determines the Factors which should be 
considered in the analysis. By identifying the relevant Factors which can be devised from the 
Time and Location, the analysis is able to identify these risks and therefore forecast events. 
The three examples shows how this approach can be applied to different locations, where the 
probability of these events vary (as seen by the attack in Jordan [higher probability] and the 
attacks in Manchester and America [lower probability]). However, although the probability of 
these events ranges as a result of the Location factor, the approach shows how these events 
could have been forecasted and classifies them as high impact, low probability events. 
Identifying the Actors, Factors, Time and Location in a continual analysis, this allows risks 
analysts to determine the probability of these risks developing into events, subsequently 
providing the means to forecast.   
What must be further noted in the risks analysis is that the devastation experienced as a result 
of these risks is dependent on the resources available and how they are managed. If the 
resources are readily available and are used effectively, this will minimise the damage and 
devastation caused. Both the attacks in Manchester and America show that even though these 
countries have the necessary intelligence to prevent and approach these events, they are not 
effectively used. In doing so, this exacerbates the ‘blind spot’ in their analysis, meaning that 
risks which can be seen by trends in the country are overlooked. By applying the Novice 
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Approach, a continuous risk analysis will successfully identify dangerous trends and relevant 
Factors which will allow risk analysts the opportunity to forecast events. It can be seen through 
the application of the approach how it considered the specific Location and then identified its 
resource capacity. Countries that have a wealth of resources are able to mitigate surprising 
events more effectively than those that do not. In the case of the latter, the Novice Approach 
still allows risk analysts to identify the necessary risks and approach them timeously. It can 
therefore be determined that regardless of the probability status of the scenario or the impact it 
may have, these are classified as high impact, low probability events.  
4.5. High Impact, Low Probability Events in Political Risk Analysis: A 
Classification   
The applicability of the Black Swan as a classification in PRA has been understood and applied 
problematically. Taleb’s primary characteristic of the Black Swan that the chances of the 
occurrence of this event is so low that it cannot be identified or approached and therefore results 
in largescale impact and devastation when it does occur. Once this has happened, Taleb calls 
the human explanation of these events as Narrative Fallacy. According to Taleb, this hindsight 
gives risk analysists and observers false pretences as to how the event could have been 
approached if the relevant factors had been timeously considered along with historical trends 
(2007:xxi). However, by considering the identified alternatives and oppositions to Taleb’s 
Black Swan, it can be seen that these risks and related events are not as irrevocably 
unidentifiable and unapproachable as stated.  
 The characteristic of the Black Swan’s unpredictability has been resolved through the 
presentation and analysis of the different approaches presented in chapter three. Here a number 
of both qualitative and quantitative alternatives to approaching high impact, low probability 
risks and related events were presented as critiques and in opposition to Taleb’s theory. Even 
though the concept of the Black Swan has been understood widely and differently, this chapter 
proved how risks analysts have still been able to develop credible approaches and have applied 
them with a relative amount of accuracy. Although these risks can be identified and their related 
events approached, this thesis does not dispute the fact that surprising events do take place. 
This element of surprise has been factored into approach strategies (as can be seen through 
scenario building) allowing analysts to plan for irregular events. Furthermore, these risks and 
events are inherently perspectivistic in nature and therefore have been analysed from a Western 
liberal perspective. Countries in the Global North (seen by the Manchester and American 
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examples) do not believe that these events could take place as they are not characteristic of 
their consolidated democracies. This creates a distinctive blind spot in risk analysis and 
assessments whereby integral indicators and factors which point to the occurrence of high 
impact, low probability events are overlooked.    
However, the Novice Approach used to analyse the examples shows that, when it is applied in 
risk analysis, that they are classified as high impact, low probability events. With a continuous 
examination of the relevant Actors, Factors, Time and Location, risk analysist are able to 
identify important trends which will enable approach strategies. In doing so, the blind spot in 
Western risk analysis is removed. The second characteristic of the Black Swan is that it is high 
in impact and will result in catastrophe and devastation as determined by the resource capacity 
and availability of a country. Taleb puts forward that the impacts of these events are calamitous 
as direct result of their unpredictability. However, as was mentioned by the researcher from 
RADAR and as can be seen by the presented examples, this is dependent on the specific 
Location and on the resources available. What might have been considered as a high impact, 
low probability event in a developing country may not be experienced the same in a developed 
country. The impact of these events can be significantly mitigated if the country has the 
necessary resources and mechanism of deployment available as a result of the state’s capacity.  
Additionally the socio-political status of these countries will determine how a state is able to 
respond, the type of resources deployed as well how effectively it will mitigate devastation. 
Furthermore, countries which have a more stable socio-political status have already established 
functional mechanisms of anti-fragility in place. These countries will therefore still be able to 
compete and benefit politically and economically in the wake of devastation. When considering 
the Manchester and American attacks, both countries were still able to continue functioning as 
result of their established bureaucracies while simultaneously to experiencing catastrophe. On 
the contrary, third world countries are often not able to manage crises whilst simultaneously 
continuing daily operations as a result of their limited resource capacity. The impact of these 
events are therefore determined by those who experience it and the subsequent conditions 
which may amplify the devastation.       
By considering the above, the two characteristics of Taleb’s Black Swan, its unpredictability 
and its impact have been nullified through the applied approach. In this, the third characteristic 
of the theory, Narrative Fallacy becomes a dispensable part of the Black Swan. The hindsight 
contributed from Narrative Fallacy, then is no longer a point of contention in PRA as the risks 
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have been identified. Here, a suitable approach method can be developed and applied. The 
Novice Approach allows risk analysts to conduct a continuous risk analysis, therefore 
identifying important risks and trends in different locations with varying resource availability. 
Risks therefore become manageable in PRA and their events are classified as high in impact 
and low in probability.   
4.6. Conclusion  
The Novice Approach has shown how high risks can be identified and monitored, providing 
risk analysts with the knowledge and opportunity to implement an approach strategy.  The three 
examples showed how the Actors, Factors, Time (or opportunity) and Location of high impact, 
low probability risks could have been successfully identified and approached before shifting 
into events of devastation. Furthermore, the contrast between these examples showed how 
countries in the Global North are often sufficiently prepared to identify and approach these 
risks and related events but as a result of their self-imposed blind spots, the analysis overlooks 
integral factors. In addition to this, although the presence of ISIL related terrorist attacks has 
been steadily increasing in Britain and other parts of Western Europe, these risks have not been 
effectively managed, resulting in mass devastation and catastrophe. Moreover, there has been 
a shift away from terrorist related attacks in America to domestic violence, as a result of the 
relaxed gun laws of the country. These gun laws and the lack of effective and robust checks 
and balances when purchasing weapons influence the increase in domestic terrorism directly. 
However, the way in which terrorism is conceptualised by the American government 
determines how it is operationalised. As domestic attacks are not explicitly considered as a 
form of terrorism, this affects the way in which risks are understood and identified, resulting 
in a blind spot in their risk analysis. In analysing the Location and its socio-political status, the 
impact of events can be determined. Furthermore, this allows for an appropriate approach and 
mitigation strategies to be developed and implemented in accordance with the resource 
capacity and availability.      
By applying the developed Novice Approach to a specific location in accordance with the needs 
of a company, a continuous risk analysis can be conducted. Relevant risks and trends can 
therefore be identified and monitored effectively. In doing so, changes in these risks are 
recognised and an approach can be effectively implemented. Although surprising events may 
still take place, the approach provides sufficient insight and knowledge for effective mitigation 
strategies to be performed. By applying the approach as a mechanism alongside a continuous 
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risk analysis, there is sufficient insight and information collected that hindsight is no longer 
needed to point to causal factors. In doing so, events of a low, medium or high probability can 
be successfully forecasted and planned for. By identifying and analysing the Actors, Factors, 
Time (opportunity) and Location in a risk analysis, this allows analysts to monitor dynamic 
trends and risks before the fact of a high impact, low probability event. This Novice Approach 
therefore acknowledges all necessary risks and trends, making events forecastable and 
approachable.    
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES  
5.1. Introduction  
This research began by analysing Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s theory on the Black Swan, 
acknowledging its origins from the discovery of the bird in the 17th century in Australia. The 
exploration of the Black Swan signified the psychological limitations humans have when 
considering their available knowledge and how this may be utilised in understanding high 
impact, low probability scenarios. The discovery of the bird provided Taleb with the foundation 
to consider and develop a theory, which identifies how and why risk analysts and decision-
makers are unable to identify high impact, low probability risks which therefore result in mass 
devastation. Furthermore, Taleb put forward that events such as the discovery of the Black 
Swan are highly improbable, suggesting they cannot be identified or approached. As a result, 
the materialisation of these risks into high impact, low probability events would result in mass 
devastation and would alter the socio-political and economic trajectories of a country or would 
drastically influence an organisations agenda and profitability.   
The research guided the central question as to whether or not the Black Swan could be applied 
as a classification of events in PRA. In accordance with this, the research then considered this 
through a critical analysis of the Black Swan theory, where oppositions and critiques to Taleb’s 
Black Swans are considered. This then showed how there are established approach strategies 
used in PRA as an alternative method in which to approach high impact, low probability risks 
and their related events. The case study of the Black Swan was studied along the lines of a 
qualitative analysis. Although the thesis was predominantly a desktop study, primary data was 
collected by conducting semi-structured key informant interviews.  
This chapter serves to highlight the key findings as they correspond to what was initially set 
out by the aims and objectives of this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter will show an evaluation 
of the research problems and questions, the main findings and the contribution this thesis may 
have on future studies.  
5.2. Evaluation of the Research Question and Main Findings  
Taleb’s Black Swan theory was developed as a perspective to understand why risk analysts and 
decision-makers are not able to identify and approach high impact, low probability risks. In 
this, the Black Swan and the events labelled as such were enigmatically understood amongst 
risk analysts. Therefore, by evaluating its conceptualisation and opperationalisation, it has not 
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been effective in identifying and approaching the risks which lead to events of high impact and 
catastrophe. Taleb claims that the inability to do so is primarily based on the fact that risk 
analysts and decision-makers are not able to consider the relevant information as a result of the 
psychological limitations characteristic of humans. Here, Taleb states that these concealed risk 
factors and indicators amalgamate into high impact, low probability events in the Extremistan 
category (as presented by Blyth, 2010:452). This becomes problematic, as considered by Taleb 
and Blyth as the information available and the ability to strategically process it predominantly 
occurs in the Mediocristan category. Therefore, the resources and information available to 
identify and develop approach strategies to high impact, low probability events are inadequate.  
The three main characteristics of the Black Swan which makes this difficult for PRA is that it 
is inherently unidentifiable and unpredictable. As a result, the impacts of these events result in 
largescale devastation which influences the socio-political and economic trajectories of a 
country or the profitability of a MNE. After the event has taken place, Taleb mentions that risk 
analysts and decision-makers develop a fallacy as to how they may have been able to approach 
these events if they had considered relevant risk factors and indicators. This then gives the 
illusion that these risks and their corresponding events can be identified and approached in the 
future. With this in mind, this is how the main research question of this thesis was formulated.  
In order to answer the main research question of this thesis, the Black Swan theory needed to 
be discussed alongside the theory of PRA. The conceptual developments which have taken 
place in PRA needed to be considered in order to assess whether or not the Black Swan could 
be considered as a classification. Furthermore, important aspects such as political instability 
and political uncertainty and forecasting versus prediction were acknowledged so that the 
limitations and delimitations of PRA were noted. By applying the relative factors and 
understandings of various types of political risk, it was shown that PRA has the ability to 
forecast and approach risks and related events with insight and precision. This is further 
enhanced by acknowledging how political uncertainty and instability shape the risk factors and 
indicators in an analysis. By understanding how correlating trends influence one another, it was 
found that risk analysts are able to identify, analyse and forecast potential events timeously. 
When a continuous analysis is conducted where primary factors and indicators are identified 
and monitored, approaches in PRA to high impact, low probability events are successful.  
Once the theory and some of the comprising elements of PRA had been considered, the author 
then linked this to Taleb’s Black Swan theory. This section considered the Black Swan theory 
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and the various conceptualisations and understandings given by other authors. In doing so, this 
showed the limitations and delimitations of the theory as presented by Taleb, and also 
considered critiques and oppositions. The three main characteristics of the Black Swan, being 
its (1) low probability, (2) high impact and (3) the Narrative Fallacy given after the event, was 
contested amongst scholars. Here, perspectives on how high impact, low probability risks and 
related events were shown that they can be successfully forecasted and approached. By gaining 
an understanding of the psychological limitations that are paramount to the development of a 
Black Swan, according to Taleb in relation to how high impact, low probability risk and related 
events are classified, alternatives and oppositions to the Black Swan were found in chapter 
three.  
Chapter three showed the applicability of the Black Swan classification in PRA by considering 
a range of quantitative, and mostly qualitative approaches. Here it was seen that a majority of 
the quantitative approach strategies used in PRA were based on probability statements. 
Mathematically determined likelihood of events is done through the computing of big data. 
Examples of these included ERM, the Monte Carlos Simulation and Bayesian Model 
Averaging. However, although these approaches are able to identify risks through the analysis 
of previous numerical data, there is insufficient practical knowledge on these methods. By 
analysing risks and related events only by methods of probability, important daily factors and 
occurrences are often overlooked.  
Risk scholars remedy this oversight through more qualitative approach strategies. Analysis of 
these comprised the second half of the chapter. Here, high impact low probability risks and 
events in PRA were evaluated alongside methods of scenario building, environmental shaping, 
early warning signals and rational thinking strategies. Different qualitative methods 
acknowledge Black Swan type events in scenario building. Additionally, this section showed 
that it is through the conceptualisation of risks and the perspective from which they are 
operationalised which makes high impact, low probability risks identifiable and approachable. 
By considering and adding a practical knowledge component based on current and changing 
events, the qualitative approaches adequately consider dynamic risk factors and indicators such 
as actors, location and the socio-economic status and resource capabilities of a country. As risk 
factors and trends are constantly changing, this needs to be accounted for in PRA. Through the 
analysis of the various qualitative approach strategies, a Novice Approach to high impact, low 
probability risks and related events can be applied alongside existing models in PRA was 
developed and discussed. This approach considered four primary indices namely Actors, 
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Factors, Time (opportunity) and Location. These indicators consider the primary points of 
analysis, which should be continuously monitored in a risk analysis.  
The evaluation of the applicability of the Black Swan in PRA continued in chapter four through 
the application of the Novice Approach to three examples. By conducting a continuous analysis 
where Actors, Factors, Time (opportunity) and Location are considered according to the needs 
of a client, approaches to high impact, low probability risks and related events is possible. The 
approach was then applied to locations in the Global North as well as the Middle East to show 
that it can be used as a point of analysis in polar-opposite states. In doing so, it was shown that 
by analysing these four indices, regardless of the nature of the event it would still be classified 
as high in impact and low in probability. The Location of where the analysis is conducted points 
risk analysts to a range of important indicators. Here it was shown that countries in the Global 
North often approach their risk analysis through a Western liberal perspective, resulting in 
‘blind spots’ and therefore strategic oversights. However, when these four indices are applied 
and are considered alongside a continuous risk analysis, all necessary strategic insight in 
approaching risks and related events is provided. As the analysis is continuous, the factors and 
indicators point to why risks may change. This provides insight into how high impact, low 
probability events can be approached.  
The approach provides risk analysts with fundamental indicators which should be considered 
in an analysis, regardless where the analysis is being conducted, who the Actors are to be 
monitored and the Factors shaping increasing risk. Analysing the socio-political status of a 
Location determines the resource availability and capacity and therefore the kind of impact and 
devastation which can be expected. In considering the socio-political status of a country, risk 
analysts are able to assess the possible damage a country could experience. Furthermore, by 
identifying and analysing these integral risk factors, potential events can be successfully 
approached.  
The notion of Narrative Fallacy therefore becomes an irrelevant point of consideration in PRA 
as the analysis of the indices provided strategic insight used to approach risks. With this in 
mind, this chapter showed that the classification of events of this nature should be known as 
‘high impact, low probability’ and not a Black Swan. The evaluation of the Black Swan in PRA 
conducted in this thesis showed that it cannot be considered as a classification of high impact, 
low probability events.  
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5.3. Contributions towards Future Studies  
In identifying how the concept of PRA has expanded to consider a variety of elements in which 
to make forecasting increasingly precise and accurate, alongside how risk analysts have 
approached, high impact, low probability risks and related events can be accounted for. This 
study has shown that by observing risks through relevant perspectives, be it a regional risk 
analysis or transfer risk analysis, the way risks are conceptualised determines how they are 
operationalised. Furthermore, by evaluating the Black Swan theory and how it has been used 
as a classification for events in PRA the study has shown that through the use of alternative 
approaches, that risks and events which are high in impact and low in probability can be 
identified. The contribution this thesis makes to the future studies of PRA is that by evaluating 
the Black Swan theory, it is concluded that its applicability to PRA as a classification of events 
is renounced. Instead, through the development of the Novice Approach used alongside 
existing PRA models it shows how risks and their potential events can be successfully 
approached and classified as high in impact and low in probability. In doing so, the thesis has 
shown how the Black Swan theory has been misconstrued as an understanding for how high 
impact, low probability events happen. As a result, risk analysts are now able to analyse and 
approach these events without the Black Swan theory derailing PRA.  
The Novice Approach comprises four primary indices which are relevant for the risk analysis 
for any needs of a client. By conducting a continuous analysis of the Actors, Factors, Time 
(opportunity) and Location risk analysts have an approach which allows them to consider risks 
as they develop from low to high impact and probability. This approach can be applied to any 
country in the world, regardless of regional developments and socio-political status. It provides 
risk analysts the strategic insight to approach risks which have the potential to develop into 
events. As the Location of the analysis will point to indicators such as socio-political status and 
resource availability, how potential events will be experienced can be predetermined. In doing 
so, necessary strategies can be developed in approaching and managing the event. Furthermore, 
although surprising events may still take place, the strategic intelligence and insight provided 
will still be of value in mitigating the impact. By considering these factors and indicators, it 
proves how high impact, low probability events can be approached through the Novice 
Approach in PRA.  
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5.4. Conclusion and Avenues towards Future Studies 
This study has found that other avenues of research regarding the Black Swan and PRA can be 
accomplished. Some of these may include the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
approach strategies, which encompass practical and probabilistic knowledge. By implementing 
the Novice Approach alongside methods of probability, this will drastically increase the 
success rate of identifying and adequately monitoring fast developing risks into potential high 
impact, low probability events.  
Furthermore, the study also highlighted how the conceptualisations of risk and terrorism should 
be refined to consider other important indicators to successfully monitor and approach risks. 
An example of this is by considering acts of lone-wolf terrorism in countries where people are 
more likely to act individually and not in correspondence with terrorist organisations. By 
continuing to develop the concept around PRA and what may contribute to risks, based on a 
specific location, approaches become increasingly accurate and PRA remains robust. In doing 
so, the blind-spot created by risk analysts and decision-makers based on the perspective of their 
analysis can become significantly marginalised.  
The study also highlighted the importance of robust checks and balances of governments and 
intelligence agencies that should be updated to have strategic value in PRA and the approaches 
to high impact, low probability events. In this, how these mechanisms are used should be 
further studied so that the partnership between them and PRA allows risk analysts to accurately 
forecast and approach high impact, low probability events which will result in minimal impact. 
By considering these for future studies, it aids the development and optimisation of PRA, 
proving its necessity for in approaching high impact, low probability risks and related events 
across industries.   
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